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EDITORIAL

Integrating ERW Programs:
The Case for Consolidating
CWD Activities
For years, the mine-action community has been revising its definition of explosive
remnants of war. Viewing unexploded ordnance, landmines, ammunition stockpiles,
and small arms/light weapons as individual threats, the mine-action community has
created distinct budgets, programs and policies to address each of them. What we’re
beginning to realize, however, is that a more integrated approach allows for greater
progress in reducing the ERW threat.
by Mark Adams [ PM/WRA ]

Members of MAG loading munitions stockpiled at a FARDC central logistics base onto trucks to be transported to a demolition ground.

we have separate budgets, programs
and strategies for dealing with them?
Is there perhaps a better, more efficient way of doing business?
A technician throws away remnants of surplus weapons destroyed by the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) at
the central logistics base during a collaboration project between Mines Advisory Group and the FARDC.

I

All photos courtesy of J.B. Russell/MAG

n the last 20 years, the organized support for humanitarian mine action has
allowed us to make great strides in reducing the landmine threat worldwide. Now,
however, we find ourselves in a position where
the traditional lines between mine action and
the threat of excess and poorly secured small
arms/light weapons and other conventional
weapons have blurred.
The traditional approach to taking mines
and unexploded ordnance out of the ground
has evolved. The mine-action community has
begun widening its scope to focus on armed violence and the problems caused by aging stockpiles, remaining landmines and UXO, and the
removal of all of this hazardous debris of conflict to make the land safe. We now actively
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work to eliminate the unintended consequences of unstable ammunition detonation or loss
of control of poorly secured government stockpiles of weapons, which are just as dangerous
as explosive remnants of war. Mine-risk education and risk management have now broadened
to become “armed-violence risk” or “ERW-risk
education/risk management.”
Wisely, our community has refined and revised its views about ERW. Perhaps it is time
to consider revising and refining our strategies
as well. I believe these new ideas should be reflected in integrated approaches to programs,
policies and budgets for dealing with ERW.
Since we no longer think about UXO, landmines, aging ammunition stockpiles or abandoned ordnance as separate entities, why do

Integration

At this time of global financial
downturn and international donor fatigue toward HMA activities,
I argue that finding a way to better deal with the ERW problem in
affected countries will allow us to
more effectively justify budgets to
our lawmakers and donors. I often
discuss with many of my counterparts “eating the elephant” one bite
at a time. I have nothing against elephants, but the analogy is that we
can only solve the problem one piece
at a time by collectively putting together all of our problems related to
ERW and integrating our efforts regarding policy, programs, resource
management and direct action. This

process allows us to deal with a very
serious problem over time in a wellthought-out, systematic way.
An integrated, centralized strategy for dealing with ERW allows us
to more effectively and compellingly demonstrate our needs and objectives. An integrated approach to
ERW brings together similar skill
sets related to explosive ordnance
disposal under one umbrella. It
streamlines communication. It can
accelerate decision-making. It allows us to be more nimble and responsive. It ensures a unified, rather
than competing, agenda for ERW. It
improves our visibility across related programs. It enhances our ability
to see and monitor the totality of our
efforts, and track and measure our
successes. It improves cost-effectiveness. And at a time when we are being asked and often required to do
more with less, these benefits seem

to be worth the effort involved to
consolidate and integrate our interests and missions as follows: HMA
+ SA/LW = ERW. Thus, the action
of dealing with ERW can be called
“conventional weapons destruction.”
Perhaps we should rethink national strategies and review our collective
ERW strategy. This review would run
the gamut from where to place the
“Office of ERW” to appeals for donor support to the development of a
new ERW national strategy. This approach is radical and even anathema
to many governments compared to
the way we have conducted business
in the past, but I believe it helps develop a national vision and provides
better synchronization and synergy
in the program and project management of all ERW activities.
Although there will always be issues of how to resolve different ministries’ equities (usually mine action
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Progress was measured by one or
more of these yardsticks:
• Area cleared
• Decreasing numbers of civilians
injured or killed
• Area of roads opened up
• Any similarly appropriate measuring tool
Now, the international community can do the same by also measuring the number of weapons/tons
of ammunition destroyed or the
number of facilities strengthened
with better security systems.
The Challenges of Integration

Members of MAG and the FARDC prepare a demolition pit to destroy stockpiles
of munitions as part of a MAG-FARDC
project to eliminate munitions stocks and
reduce the risk of accidents.

is conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Interior
and SA/LW/ammunition destruction is relegated to the Ministry of
Defense), an integrated approach
allows one office or one ministry
to take the lead. Whether Defense
or Foreign Affairs, it doesn’t matter, but having it all under one roof
allows for a more streamlined decision-making process to deal with a
huge, multi-level problem.
In the early years, the international community always encouraged affected governments to
develop their own mine-action capacity and a national mine-action
center, as well as to develop a strategic, integrated mine-action plan.
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A national strategic plan that
conducts humanitarian mine action
and executes the reduction of stockpiles of excess weapons and unstable
ammunition could be managed by
an “Office of ERW Removal” or “Office of Conventional Weapons Destruction.” Below is a sample list of
challenges that office might face:
• Preventing loss of life (since civilian communities have grown up
around ammunition storage sites)
• Reducing the amount of weapons and high stocks of unstable
ammunition accessible to criminal
elements by improving inventory
control
• Designating stockpiled ammunition as “excess” if unassociated with
a host-nation’s weapons system
• Identifying old weapons systems
no longer required by defense
forces
• Developing a destruction plan for
SA/LW and ammunition to reduce loss of control and accidental explosion risks
• Managing and protecting the appropriate amount of weapons necessary to meet host-nation security
and defense needs
• Conducting an adequate defense

modernization review to indentify real war-fighting needs.
• Initiating strict security for at-risk
weapons systems (such as shoulder-fired missile systems) to prevent civilian and commercial
impacts
This sounds great in theory, but
how does it “play” in the real world?
In 2004, the U.S. Department of
State’s Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs merged the program offices of Humanitarian Demining and
SA/LW Destruction to form the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA). The next step in
this evolution will integrate all aspects of ERW into one program budget, thereby focusing a single lens
on the global human-security problem of ERW. Our consolidated budget will be called Non-proliferation
Antiterrorism Demining and other
Related Conventional Weapons Destruction. With this consolidated
budget, we can better focus on the
most severe ERW problems in the
world. We will continue to be fully
engaged in severely mine-/UXO-affected countries such as Afghanistan,
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Cambodia, Iraq, Laos and Vietnam, and further strengthen our
efforts to reduce excess stockpiles
of weapons and destroy old, unstable ammunition in these and other
countries.
The United States is not the only
nation or organization that has seen
efficiencies in merging CWD programs. The International Trust Fund
for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance has developed a five-year
strategic plan envisioning the expansion of its role from HMA in the
Balkans to global ERW remediation. I salute the Slovenian government for its great vision and huge

undertaking. Similarly, James Madison University’s Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
has changed the name of this publication to The Journal of ERW and
Mine Action. Other examples exist;
these are but two.
Change takes time. New national policies and mine-action organization objectives won’t happen
overnight. For that reason, when I
talk to groups of landmine experts,
I encourage embracing the problem
of inventory control, destruction
and security of SA/LW and ammunition. Likewise, when I talk to
SA/LW experts, I encourage them
to talk to and coordinate with their
mine-action counterparts.
I realize the difficulty for those
in some countries to talk laterally
to their counterparts in the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign

Dear Ms. Carter Fay,

Affairs or Ministry of Interior, but
reaching across ministries is the way
of the future. With a unified, ERW
strategic plan the global CWD community can increase its outreach
and access to the donor community
and, ideally, reduce the ERW impact
on civilians.

Mark Adams is Senior Advisor for U.S.
Conventional Weapons Destruction, U.S.
Department of State. Prior to his retirement from active duty as a Colonel in the
U.S. Marine Corps, Adams served as the
Marine Corps Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State and the Deputy Director,
Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, a position he held from 1998–
2001. In his current assignment, Adams
has negotiated numerous small arms/
light weapons/man-portable air-defense
systems (MANPADS)/ammunition-destruction agreements worldwide.

Conclusion

Whether you work in government
or a regional organization, I encourage you to review your achievements
over the past years, embrace an expanded view of dealing with ERW
and reinvent your organization. I
believe our great collective community has a wealth of knowledge
and capacity for innovation that can
carry us far into the future to better
handle the ERW problem and, thus,
make our world a safer place.

Mark W. Adams
Senior Advisor
U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction
Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
U.S. Department of State (PM/ WRA)
SA-3, Suite 6100
2121 Virginia Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20522 / USA
Tel: +1 202 663 0111
Fax: + 1 202 663 0090
E-mail: AdamsMW@state.gov
Website: http://state.gov/t/pm/wra

Letter to the Editor

I would first like to take this opportunity to introduce myself. I have recently been appointed as
Geneva Call's Coordinator for Landmines and other Explosive Devices. I will therefore be the main
contact person for all related issues within the organization.
I would also like to inquire whether the authors of the article "Non-state Actors and Mine Action:
Complications and Solutions," in the most recent issue of The Journal of ERW and Mine Action (Issue 14.2), have any illustrations of where humanitarian engagement with NSAs have led to their
enjoying "a new bargaining position that they may in turn use to advance their international standing," or use "to their advantage by recruiting new members or securing new resources from interested sponsors"? As you are probably well aware, this is an issue that is potentially of great concern
to Geneva Call, and which we endeavour to mitigate. It is also one side of an argument used to discredit such humanitarian engagement. We'd therefore be very keen to receive any supporting evidence where this proved to be the case.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Best regards,
Katherine Kramer
Programme Director (Asia)
Acting Coordinator on Landmines and Other Explosives
Geneva Call
E-mail: info@genevacall.org
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Subscriber Survey Results
by Lois Carter Fay [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]

T

he staff of The Journal of ERW and Mine Action
wants to thank you, our subscribers, for telling
us what you think about our publication. We
want you to know, “We heard you!” Over the next few issues, we will implement several changes as a result of this
feedback. For instance, we plan to do the following:
• Create a discussion-driven forum rather than a topicdriven publication
• Redesign and relaunch the CISR website, better integrating it with the MAIC website
• Emphasize popular content (Notes from the Field,
R&D and more articles about victim assistance)
• Create new sections (several ideas were given) and
publish some of the less popular sections (Book Reviews, Unsung Heroes) online-only
• Target specific authors to provide in-depth content
from experienced field personnel
• Limit or eliminate the student-written articles
In total, 176 readers completed the survey, which is an
outstanding 10-percent response rate. Contrary to what
we believed, we discovered that The Journal is being delivered in a timely manner, with 64 percent of the respondents saying they receive it within one month of mailing.
In addition, although we do not plan to implement a subscription fee, we were pleased to learn that 59 percent of
those responding would be willing to pay US$10 or more
to continue receiving The Journal.
When asked, “Which topics do you find most helpful?” several sections/topics were listed multiple times.
In particular, many readers noted they like the R&D articles, Notes from the Field, and articles dealing with risk
education and victim assistance. Case studies, hero profiles and organization profiles were also mentioned repeatedly, with some respondents loving them and others
not liking them at all.
On the other hand, when asked, “Which sections provide the least value?” readers again repeatedly said hero
profiles. Book reviews, country profiles and “sob stories”
were also mentioned. One respondent said, “I think every now and again, you have an ‘odd’ article that could
have been approached from a different perspective; however, overall, any article that makes it to publication is
worth the time to read it.”
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We found that many of our readers are sharing their
Journal copies with others; some share it with as few as
one other person while others share it with as many as
20 people. Several readers mentioned that they never let
their printed editions out of their offices because they
find the content too valuable to lose and they refer to past
What sections of The Journal do you tend to read?

articles frequently. One respondent commented, “I cite
the article and make a photocopy of the article. I don’t
want to lose my copy.”
Below are selected responses* to the question, “What
do you like best about The Journal?”:
• The focus on various regions and topics of current
concern or interest.
• Accuracy and details.
• Some useful articles, like a recent issue on ERW had
one very good article from Arms Control people. Top
quality paper.
• Electronic availability and maintenance of links; also
historic links (i.e., online links to archived articles).
• Good mix between text and pictures; easy to read.
• Focus on content relating to mine action and its various pillars of engagement (clearance, mine-risk education, survivor assistance, program development,
etc.).
• It’s keeping the community together, allowing us to
share experiences.
• It’s all industry-related. No distractions and nothing
too political.
• Articles on actual experiences in mine action and explosive remnants of war.
• I feel The Journal presents a balanced and technical
response regarding the issue of demining.

“What do you like least about The
Journal?” elicited these (selected) responses:*
• Sometimes the articles are a little irrelevant and self-promotional. Time lag between article
development and publication.
• The Journal’s use of the term
“mines” is inexact, considering
the amount of UXO and also improvised explosive devices encountered.
• I miss the discussion of the future
need for MA and the discussion
of how to integrate MA in development and reconstruction.
• The lack of discussion forum.
• The lack of editorial rigour or
peer review. It appears more like
a magazine than a journal.
• Articles are too theoretical.
• Sometimes, I see some articles
that are written in a very high
level of literacy and technical language that is not easy to understand.
• Same sources for articles.
We also received several interesting ideas from our readers regarding what new sections or topics they
would like to see. One reader suggested adding more photo essays to
the printed edition and more video on the website. Another said he
Which format do you prefer when you
read The Journal—hard copy or online?

Do you share your copy of The Journal
with others?

Profile of Journal Subscribers:

would like to see more topics related to the betterment of deminers’
lives (working conditions, problems,
benefits, etc.), and topics exposing
sloppy UXO removal work. Other
suggestions were:
• Guest editorial or op-ed, trends,
“Where Are They Now?,” historical essays, victim assistance,
more integration of conventional
weapons destruction
• New developments in standards
and procedures; new equipment
developments
• Things from a social-scientific perspective, incorporating an
understanding of how politics,
economics and social issues impact the manner in which mine
action is carried out
• Straightforward articles dealing
with successes and failures
• Updates on the global landmine/
ERW situation
• Personal stories of people in the
field; this is an unforgiving business and it’s nice to read stories
about others whom I have met
• All in all, we feel we have received valuable survey feedback.
We will take your suggestions to

heart and evaluate which ones
are feasible as we chart our future
course. Thank you for your time
and ideas!
*Note: All responses have been edited for grammar, spelling and clarity.

Lois Carter Fay, APR, is Editor-inChief of The Journal of ERW and
Mine Action and Project Manager
on other publishing projects, including To Walk the Earth in Safety. Prior
to joining the MAIC in 2005, Carter
Fay was self-employed with MarketingIdeaShop.com, a consulting and
publishing company, and today she
continues this activity part-time.

Lois Carter Fay, APR
Editor-in-Chief
The Journal of ERW and Mine Action
Mine Action Information Center
Center for International
Stabilization and Recovery
James Madison University
800 South Main Street, MSC 4902
Harrisonburg, VA 22807 / USA
Tel: +1 540 568 2503
Fax: +1 540 568 8176
E-mail: carterlx@jmu.edu
Website: http://cisr.jmu.edu or
http://maic.jmu.edu
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FOCUS

The Bridge from Hold to Build
In Afghanistan, the United States and United Nations are developing a new approach
to community-based demining by funding local nongovernmental organizations. The
use of these Afghan NGOs has not only allowed clearance to begin more quickly and
continue more effectively, but has also helped the local population along the path to
recovery and supported overall counterinsurgency efforts.
by Colonel Yori Escalante [ United States Marine Corps ]

N

ow Zad, located in the district of
Helmand province that bears the same
name, was once the second largest
city of the province with a population of more
than 30,000. Although somewhat isolated in
the northern part of Helmand, it had everything
that an Afghan needed to flourish, including fertile farmland and bustling bazaars. However, in
early 2006 the Taliban took control and drove
away the entire population of Now Zad. Many of
the residents moved as far away as Lashkar Gah,
an arduous 125-kilometer (48-mile) journey on
rough roads through Taliban-infested areas,
and wondered if they would ever return to their
homes. After taking over Now Zad, the militants filled the homes, shops, schools and streets
with mines and improvised explosive devices,
much as they had done in many other areas.
The second major offensive in Helmand
province for Task Force Leatherneck (the 2nd
Marine Expeditionary Brigade), Operation Cobra’s Anger in December 2009, was to remove the
Taliban from Now Zad. Once cleared, Now Zad
was a prime candidate for immediate assistance
and the type of international development critical to the United States’ counterinsurgency
strategy of "Clear-Hold-Build." This strategy
involves clearing a target area of insurgents
(Clear), providing security and infrastructure
to locals while screening the population for
insurgents (Hold), and establishing or re-establishing essential services using both NGO and
local workforces (Build). The only problem was
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that the explosive remnants of the battle for
Now Zad and the large number of mines and
IEDs left by the Taliban still littered the area.
The Strategy

The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) manages and executes the work required to create
the “bridge” from hold to build within the U.S.
counterinsurgency strategy. Known as Conventional Weapons Destruction, the effort addresses humanitarian mine action, battle-area
clearance and small-arms and light-weapons
destruction. CWD has enabled the United
States to be the international leader in this important aspect of humanitarian assistance and
development. Since 1993, the United States has
provided more than US$1.8 billion to more
than 80 countries to conduct demining and unexploded-ordnance clearance, and since 2001
has destroyed more than 1.4 million weapons
and 80,000 tons of otherwise at-risk, unstable
or unsecure weapons and ammunition that
could find their way into the militants’ hands.1
In Afghanistan alone, the United States has
funded projects totaling nearly $200 million.
PM/WRA provides funds to U.S. contractors
and international nongovernmental organizations to conduct clearance and destruction
operations, develop survivor and educational
services, and establish capacity for the host nation to eventually take ownership of the effort.

Recruiting and training a local workforce is vital to community-based demining.
Photo courtesy of Alex Henegar

Community-Based Demining

A concept now being used by
the United States and the United
Nations in Afghanistan is one of
community-based demining. Often,
when contractors and international NGOs establish demining and
clearance operations in an area, the
workforce is recruited from the local area, trained and employed to
execute the project, and later dispatched to other areas needing clearance. Thus, in a way, all demining
and clearance operations can be
called community-based. However, CBD in Afghanistan is different
in many ways because the approach
uses Afghan NGOs that have worked
in Afghanistan for 20 years or more.
The Afghan NGOs have built a relationship with the population and
are able to recruit individuals who
will remain after the project is complete. The NGOs can also enter an
area very soon after combat operations have ceased. Often, international NGOs will not be welcomed
or cannot gain access to those areas
due to the security situation. This
aspect is important since in the past,
demining and clearance operations
have only been attempted after conflicts have ended. In the conflict in

Afghanistan, quick action is vital
to rebuilding trust and confidence
with the local residents. The United
States currently funds five Afghan
NGOs—Afghan Technical Consultants, Demining Agency for Afghanistan, Mine Clearance Planning
Agency, Mine Detection Center,
and Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghanistan Rehabilitation—that are uniquely positioned
to implement these community-based
projects quickly and effectively.
CBD differs from other demining
and clearance efforts; organizations
work closely with the local leadership in a specific village, district or
province. The local leaders identify
projects and assist in informing the
residents of the impact of CBD and
the need for a local workforce. This
workforce, many times consisting of
young men who would otherwise be
recruited by the Taliban for insurgent operations, is then trained in
the skill of demining. Often the men
are put through vocational training
during their off-duty hours to ensure they have a relevant trade once
the project is complete. This in turn
builds confidence and a sense of
ownership in the overall project, as
well as a sense of pride that the lo-

cal populations are involved in the
improvement of their village or district. Such examples of CBD reinforce local governance and reduce
the influence of insurgents.
Successes of CBD in Now Zad

PM/WRA regularly makes an effort to coordinate closely with U.S.
or Coalition Forces in an area, and
Task Force Leatherneck was no exception. The U.S. Marines quickly
understood the importance of demining and clearance operations and
the benefits that CBD could provide.
Soon after the completion of the
operation, Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson, the Commander of Task Force Leatherneck, along
with members of the U.S. Embassy
in Kabul, Helmand Provincial Governor Mangal and leaders from Now
Zad, as well as representatives of the
five Afghan demining NGOs funded by PM/WRA, conducted a demining shura. Shura, the Arabic word
for consultation, is the way most Islamic tribal leaders meet to resolve
problems and issues. The purpose
of this shura was to highlight the
need to implement a CBD project
in Now Zad, one that would address
the most urgent clearance needs of
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the village and enable further development projects to begin. Brigadier General Nicholson stressed
that residents and local leadership
needed to step up and take control
of Now Zad or risk the town being
returned to the Taliban. As a result
of the shura, close coordination and
planning commenced between the
Marines, PM/WRA, U.S. Embassy,
United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan, local leadership and the NGOs.

U.S. and local leadership must be involved to ensure the “bridge” from hold
to build is successful.
Photo courtesy of the author

Vital to the NGOs and the leaders of Now Zad were assurances of
security from Task Force Leatherneck—security that was not visible, but effective. What eventually
materialized was a collaborative effort for a $1.8 million project with
three of the five NGOs (Mine Clearance Planning Agency, the Demining Agency for Afghanistan and
the Mine Detection Center) where
the strengths of each organization
were leveraged. The project began in
March 2010 and is scheduled to be
completed within 12 months, employing more than 120 local staff,
benefitting more than 1,350 families and clearing 594,000 square kilometers (229,345 square miles) of
land covering the four most affect-
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ed communities in and around Now
Zad: Ali Zai, Barakzi, Deh Meyan
and Sarkani.
Over and above the initial benefits, the project includes the establishment of a clinic, primarily
for the medical care of the deminers, but also to serve as a source of
health support for the citizens of
Now Zad. As the word spread that
deminers were starting their work,
many of the displaced members of
Now Zad started to return, some for
the first time in four years.
CBD has been conducted in Afghanistan for several years, with
projects funded and executed in Kunar, Nangahar and Kandahar provinces. The projects’ workforce was
recruited from the local area and
included vocational training. Unlike the projects that began several years after fighting had ceased in
the Kunar, Nangahar and Kandahar
provinces, however, the project in
Now Zad commenced within weeks
of combat concluding, giving development agencies the opportunity to
provide relief to the Now Zad area
sooner than expected. The project
in Now Zad is seen as a model for
future uses of CBD, especially since
it uses Afghan NGOs and beginning
work early with local authorities
means clearance operations can allow relief and development to arrive
quickly. This further builds the population’s confidence in the NATO
International Security Assistance
Force’s work, and more importantly, in the local Afghan government.
Conclusion

Confidence is key to successful
counterinsurgency operations. The
local population must have confidence in the forces in its area and in

the agencies and organizations providing relief and development. The
Marine Corps’ approach to counterinsurgency stresses building this
confidence through close coordination and partnering with local
forces, government officials and the
citizens of the areas for which they
are responsible. In order to provide
relief and development quickly, the
time between hold and build must be
as short as possible. Many times, due
to combat operations recently concluding, this time is delayed in order
to clear the area of explosive remnants of war. This delay could potentially result in a loss of confidence by
the local communities in the forces
operating in their area. CBD is yet
another way for the United States
to insure that the “bridge” from
hold to build is as short as possible.
see endnotes page 80
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Destruction of Cluster Munitions
in Moldova
For some countries affected by cluster munitions, the obligations to demilitarize that
accompany ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions may appear daunting.
In 2009, however, Norwegian People’s Aid undertook a pilot project in Moldova to
find a cheaper, more efficient alternative-disposal method. They discovered that not
only can destruction of cluster munitions be done more effectively, but also that by
using locally administered programs, international organizations can promote capacity building and increased employment while also bolstering national pride and commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
by Colin King [ C King Associates, Ltd. ]

D

uring the Oslo Process, it became
clear that several nations were concerned about their obligations to destroy cluster munition stockpiles under Article
3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In
fact, it soon became apparent that this might be
a significant obstacle to signing or ratification
for some countries.
Industrial demilitarization plants exist in
several developed nations; however, costs are
high, and most are running at or near capacity.
Even if the resources were available, it would
be uneconomical for an industrial unit to gear
up for the disposal of small quantities of cluster munitions, especially if these were unusual
types. A new process would involve a great deal
of additional effort, including research on the
ammunition, development of a new procedure,
fabricating or adapting existing machinery, retraining the workforce, development of adequate quality control measures and so forth.
The need for another option led Norwegian
People’s Aid to examine alternative-disposal means on a national or regional basis. One
possible benefit of using locally administered
programs was program ownership. This ownership, or increased national involvement,
brings with it tangible gains, such as capacity
building and increased employment, as well as

intangible gains, such as a strong demonstration of commitment to the CCM and a sense
of national pride. Other potential advantages of
utilizing locally administered programs included lower cost and faster completion. During the
2008–09 period, a preliminary study established
that locally administered, alternative-disposal
options were realistic.
Moldova Pilot Program

The concept of small-scale regional programs was presented at the 2009 Berlin
Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions;1 here, Moldova was among a small
number of delegations that approached NPA
to express an interest in a pilot project.
An NPA assessment team visited Moldova
in October 2009 and identified five types of
Russian cluster-bomb and submunition payloads in the Moldovan inventory. The submunitions included three types of anti-armor
bomblets (PTAB-2.5, PTAB-2.5M and PTAB10-5) and two types of fragmentation bomblets (AO-1SCh and AO-2.5RT). Externally, the
bombs were in reasonably good condition,
suggesting that the submunitions would be
well-preserved.
Unloading of cluster bombs. The NPA team
conducted all work at a Bulboaca military
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Moldovan soldiers, under supervision, removing the tail from an
RBK-500 cluster bomb.
All photos courtesy of the author

facility, which includes a demolition area. Bomb disassembly was carried out in two adjacent tents, despite
extremely cold weather and heavy snow. A team of Moldovan soldiers, trained in demolition under NPA supervision for unloading the submunitions from the bombs
and assembling the demolitions, mainly used the first
tent. The NPA team used the second tent for submunition disassembly.
The two types of bomb containers, RBK-250 and
RBK-500, were similar in structure and were easily unloaded once the tail section was removed. After refining their technique, the Moldovan soldiers successfully
conducted the unloading procedure in approximately 20
minutes per bomb.
Submunition disassembly. One of the primary objectives was to create simple, practical processes to remove
bomblet fuzes, thereby exposing the explosive filling in
order to make subsequent demolition simple and safe.
This objective was achieved with four out of the five submunition types, with the AO-2.5RT as the exception. A
number of these bomblets were also dismantled and defuzed; however, the process was considered too delicate,
and therefore dangerous, for inclusion in a regional destruction program.
In keeping with the concept of regional program
ownership, locally available tools were used wherever possible. The few exceptions included hook-and-pin
wrenches and a chain vice, which was particularly useful for securing the bomblet bodies.
Explosive demolition. Successful explosive demolition of cluster munitions is notoriously difficult, as
unexploded submunitions tend to be “kicked out.” Bom-
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blets may become armed as they are ejected from the
demolition, risking widespread site contamination with
hazardous ordnance.
The relatively straightforward process of removing
the submunitions from the bomb body makes successful
demolition substantially easier. Furthermore, taking the
additional step of defuzing the bomblets before demolition not only eliminates much of the residual hazard,
but also exposes the high-explosive filling, thus further
increasing the likelihood of complete detonation.
Once defuzed, demolitions were prepared by placing
the bomblet bodies in wooden ammunition crates and
covering them with a layer of TNT demolition blocks.
This allowed the indoor preparation of shots, minimizing the time needed for final preparation at the demolition grounds. The efficiency of this process indicated
that this technique could be employed successfully on a
far larger scale.

AO-1Sch bomblet bodies after the explosive charge has been
burned out.

Burning. Burning has a number of potential advantages for bomblet destruction, including avoidance of the
noise and shock involved in demolition, elimination of
the need for large stocks of high explosives, minimizing
metallic contamination, and the retention of steel scrap.
Burning normally requires detonator extraction and
exposure of the main explosive filling, which was easily
achieved in a single step by removal of the fuze-assembly from all of the bomblet types, except for the AO2.5RT. Once defuzed, the bomblet bodies were stacked

into wooden ammunition crates
and covered with a propellant layer
that had been salvaged from artillery ammunition. The bomblet bodies were then ignited remotely using
electrical squibs placed into small
bags of black powder.2
The A-IX-2 explosive used in the
AO-1SCh bomblet was particularly difficult to ignite, and burning
out these bomblets required careful
preparation. A number of successful
burns were conducted, once again
indicating the technique could be
applied within a large-scale process.
Inerting. A selection of each
bomblet type was designated free
from explosives for use as demonstration and training aids. This involved complete disassembly of the
fuzing-system to locate and remove
all components containing energetic
material and refitting the now freefrom-explosive fuze assembly to a
bomblet body from which the explosive had been burned out.
A simple quality-control system
was implemented for the inerting
process, involving two people independently confirming the absence
of explosive components, with each
marking the assembly using paint.
The finished training aids were then
marked clearly in blue, the NATO
color code for inert items.
Re-use of warheads. Fuze and
tail-assembly removal offers the
possibility of retaining the shaped
charge warhead for non-hostile applications, such as explosive-ordnance disposal, demolition or
engineering. This option was highlighted during early program proposals and is especially relevant to
the warheads used in PTAB bomblets; it may also be applicable to dual-purpose improved-conventional

Removing the fuze from a PTAB-2.5.

munition, such as the US M42, M46
and M77 series.
PTAB-2.5 and PTAB-2.5M-bomblet disassembly confirmed the
achievability of this option. However, a complication in the PTAB2.5M-shaped charge is the presence
of a flash-receptive detonator, which
must be pressed out to make it safe.
Conclusions

The research-and-development
phase of Moldova’s pilot program
was a great success despite extreme
weather, a difficult operating environment and a restricted time
frame. The operation confirmed that
regional demilitarization programs
involving Russian cluster bombs require minimal resources and could,
therefore, be implemented anywhere.
As an unexpected bonus, Moldova quickly announced its intention to ratify the CCM, having been
commended for its positive engagement and encouraged by its ability
to achieve the demands of Article
3. Moldova subsequently became
the final state needed to trigger the
CCM’s entry into force.
In addition to the immediate results, the availability of such a national capability may well prove
valuable for further regional cluster-munition destruction programs.
Furthermore, the facilities and expertise in ammunition disposal may
be utilized or adapted for other ammunition types, which will inevita-

bly require attention as aging Soviet
ordnance becomes unusable.
Currently, the NPA team is liaising with a number of other countries that are interested in developing
their own locally administered cluster-munitions destruction programs.
The question is whether the principle
can be applied safely to more complex or challenging ammunition,
such as cargo projectiles, rockets and
NATO cluster bombs.
Reproduced with permission from
HIS (Global) Limited–Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 2010–11.
Note: Since this article was written, Moldova has concluded the final phase of this project, in which
their entire stockpile of cluster bombs
was destroyed. The work was carried out by Moldovan soldiers under
the supervision of NPA and C King
Associates Ltd, making them the first
nation to achieve compliance with
CCM Article 3 using a “self-help” demilitarization program.
see endnotes page 80
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Albania Makes Progress
		
in Demilitarization
With the goal of destroying all excess munitions by 2013, the Albanian government is
working to eliminate stockpiles of excess military munitions. Following a 2008 deadly
explosion at a munitions dismantling factory, the government established safer mandates and successfully destroyed thousands of tons of munitions.
by Captain Matt Goodyear [ United States Army ]

T

wo years after the 2008 deadly explosion1 at
a demilitarization 2 facility on the outskirts of
Tirana, Albania’s capital, the Albanian government has made significant progress in reducing excess
stockpiles and demilitarizing hazardous and obsolete
ordnance. Although ridding the country of more than
100,000 tons (9,072 metric tons) of outdated and dangerous munitions and weapons has been a formidable challenge, the government’s efforts, in conjunction with the
international community, have resulted in a robust and
effective demilitarization program. Another 5,000 tons
(4,536 metric tons) is expected to be destroyed by the
end of 2010. This notable improvement in the management of Albania’s excess munitions stockpiles reflects
the government’s commitment to the process and illustrates the impact of international contributions and
collaboration.

Albania’s History of Explosives

The communist period of Albania's history (1946–
91) was marked by a massive build-up in munitions and
weapons of Albanian, Chinese and Soviet origin. Hundreds of depots were placed in every corner of Albania
and were stocked with more than 100,000 tons (9,072
metric tons) of munitions. Each depot housed various
types of munitions that became potentially dangerous
after years of degradation. With the fall of communism
in 1991, maintenance and management of the depots was
neglected, and when anarchy enveloped the country in
1997, many depots were damaged, destroyed or looted.
After stability was restored, the return of reclaimed munitions to depots was not handled systematically, further
exacerbating an already dangerous storage environment.
Now, two years after the explosion, ordnance has been
consolidated into 44 depots. Because of their age, poor
maintenance and lack of proper storage, some of these
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munitions are unstable. In addition, due to residential
encroachment, several depots are located close to civilian populations, endangering the lives of many people.
Gërdec Depot

Some demilitarization efforts began in 2001, including an assistance project by the NATO Maintenance and
Supply Agency, which destroyed more than 8,700 tons
(7,892 metric tons) of munitions between 2002 and 2007.
Then, on 15 March 2008, a massive explosion occurred
at an ammunition dismantling facility in Gërdec, 30 kilometers (19 miles) west of Tirana and 3 kilometers (2
miles) from the national airport. Previously home to
a tank division, the site had been converted to allow a
private company to demilitarize ordnance and sell the
scrap residue. The residents of the area were unwittingly living too close to the factory, and the blast killed 26
people, injuring more than 300.1 The explosion’s exact
cause is still unknown; however, unsafe standards and
practices were clearly being used at the Gërdec facility. As a result of this disaster, the Minister of Defence,
along with 29 other people, was subsequently charged
with abuse of office. The explosion and the public outcry
that ensued brought demilitarization efforts in Albania
to a standstill and created an atmosphere of paralysis in
the Albanian Ministry of Defence. During the months
immediately following the disaster, Albania, with technical assistance from the international community,
worked to establish the necessary legal framework to
demilitarize munitions and upgrade the decrepit facilities to reduce risk.
The National Plan

In the summer of 2008, the Albanian government established a plan to demilitarize the remaining 85,000–
90,000 tons (77,111–81,647 metric tons) of various

Shells from demilitarized 82mm mortars.
photo courtesy of william wade, sterling international, llc

ordnance types. According to the plan, three primary
factories would be used for industrial dismantling and
destruction, including cutting open the mortars and
removing the explosives, and eight demolition ranges would be used for open detonation3 and burning. To
realize this goal, significant financial and other contributions would be needed not only by the Albanian government, but also by foreign donors and international
institutions. An ongoing demilitarization project managed by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
in the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs (PM/WRA) was expanded to provide an additional US$2 million for the Gërdec munitions cleanup.”4 In addition, the international community5 offered
financial support and expertise to safely clear the explosion site and demilitarize the remaining stockpiles. Industrial demilitarization finally commenced in January
2009 and open detonation began several months later.
Since then, the Albanian government has prioritized its
demilitarization efforts.

Mjekes Explosives Factory

During its 2001–07 project, NAMSA developed part
of the communist-era Mjekes explosives factory (just
east of Elbasan in central Albania) to destroy smallarms ammunition. As a result of the project and a successful business in reprocessing explosive material, the
Mjekes explosives factory received significant investment and was developed into a modern facility. In 2008,
the Mjekes factory purchased two band saws to destroy
3,400 tons (3,084 metric tons) of 160mm mortars. After cutting the mortars and revealing the explosives,
the workers used a steam generator to remove the explosives, and the shells were either discarded or sold for
scrap. The explosives were then either burned or reprocessed to sell as low-grade explosives.
The Mjekes factory began processing the 160mm
mortars in January 2009, and by June 2010, had successfully completed the project without incident. The
factory line is now being adjusted to dismantle the approximately 11,000 tons (9,979 metric tons) of excess
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The incinerator, which went into
use in January 2010, can burn between five and eight tons (5.54 and
7.26 metric tons) of bullets per day.
To date, it has destroyed approximately 360 tons (327 metric tons)
of 7.62mm bullets.
Gramsh Factory

Solely run by Albania, the
Gramsh factory also does industrial demilitarization. The government
has established a line there to demilitarize 37mm ammunition. Due
to its proximity to the local population, the factory must maintain
a very low production rate and explosive-storage capacity. The process does not use band saws and
involves manually dismantling the
37mm projectile from the fuze and
steaming out the explosives. The
Albanian government expects to
complete destruction of all 4,000
tons (363 metric tons) of 37mm projectiles before the end of 2010, when
the plant will retool the line to handle up to 100mm projectiles.
Albanian EOD and Ranges
The Mjekes demilitarization facility.
Photo courtesy of Anthony Baird

120mm rounds. The government of Denmark through
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe recently donated to Mjekes four more band saws
to establish a second dismantling line to handle other
large-caliber munitions.
Polican Munitions Factory

While the communist-era Polican munitions factory
near Berat in Southern Albania was part of the original
NAMSA project, it did not receive capital investment,
and its technology and upkeep were significantly behind Mjekes. PM/WRA assisted the government of Albania by funding a U.S. contractor, Armor Group, to
supervise demilitarization operations there. Polican did
not have the capital to buy band saws, and thus, demil-

18

focus | the journal of ERW and mine action | fall 2010 | 14.3

itarization occurred through simple dismantling (unscrewing the heads and steaming out the explosives). In
May 2009, Polican began the demilitarization of 82mm
Chinese-made mortars with TNT explosives. In early 2010, Polican received a donation of four band saws
from Denmark. With these band saws, the factory is
developing a dismantling line to demilitarize the more
sensitive Amatol-filled Soviet mortars. So far, Polican
has destroyed 2,300 tons (2,087 metric tons) of Albania's 15,000 tons (13,608 metric tons) of 82mm mortars.
Polican also benefits from a PM/WRA-funded portable incinerator for use in destroying small caliber
ammunition, beginning with 7.62mm bullets. The incinerator heats the bullets until the gunpowder explodes, leaving the melted brass and lead for scrap.

Due to previous accidents on
ranges, all open detonation of munitions in Albania was suspended
in 2007. However, open detonation
plays an integral part in the new national demilitarization plan. Thus,
in 2009, the government of Albania
designated eight ranges and began
training its explosive ordnance disposal unit for detonation activities.
The Albanian Armed Forces EOD
units also received training from
the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction
Agency and U.S. EOD Navy experts.
Despite various setbacks (including
sometimes resistant civilian populations, theft of scrap and minor accidents on site), the EOD company

has made impressive progress, destroying up to 900 tons (817 metric
tons) of ordnance per month. With
support from the Dutch government, AAF EOD received three electrical firing devices to improve its
safety on demolition ranges. Additional EOD safety and personal protective equipment was provided to
Albania by the U.S. European Command. This equipment was used to
train EOD operators, and it will increase safe operations through communication and positioning data
with GPS-enabled radios. Since beginning work in 2009, the AAF EOD
teams have destroyed approximately
4,400 tons (3,992 metric tons) of various size munitions.
The Way Forward

In 2009, Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha announced the
demilitarization of all hazardous ordnance by 2013. With 75,000
tons (68,037 metric tons) of ordnance identified for destruction,
experts concur that this is an ambitious goal. To support demilitarization, the Albanian government and
PM/WRA jointly funded a NAMSA
feasibility study to assess a possible
NAMSA project built upon the success of its 2002–07 project. In March
2010, NATO members approved the
project and opened a NAMSA office in Tirana in September 2010.
While the memorandum of understanding between NAMSA and the
government of Albania is still under
review, experts anticipate demilitarization under this long-term project
will begin in January 2011, funded
primarily by the United States, following the signing of the MOU.
Through these projects, Albania
is developing specialized EOD and
demilitarization capabilities that are

in high demand throughout the region. As the country completes its
national demilitarization plan, the
Albanian government and military
will end up with a viable skill set that
could be beneficial to NATO and
other countries with deteriorating
stockpiles. Likewise, the Mjekes factory, with minor upgrades in equipment and training, could become a
regional hub for demilitarization.
While the prospect of regional weapons destruction cooperation may
seem ambitious, a regional approach
to stockpile reduction is beginning
slowly to take shape. By taking advantage of assistance from the international community, Albania is
strengthening its expertise, gaining
proficiency in munitions and ordnance handling, and is establishing
appropriate munitions dismantling
and destruction facilities.
see endnotes page 80
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The Terter Regional
Vocational Training Center
Recently, International Eurasia Press Fund helped to form the Terter Regional Vocational Training Center to provide computer, business and vocational training for mine
victims and their family members. The victims are also given medical and legal help
by the Azerbaijan Mine Victims Association. The VTC and the AMVA both work to
help war victims reintegrate into society.
by Nick Nwolisa [ International Eurasia Press Fund ]

T

he Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action
was established in 1998 and since then, has carried out mine-clearance operations and humanitarian support in several regions and communities in
Azerbaijan. Beginning in 2000, the International Eurasia Press Fund joined ANAMA in conducting various
surveys to determine the impact of landmines on Azerbaijani territory. The survey results indicated that mine
victims predominately resided in Agstafa, Fizuli, Goranboy and Terter.
In 2004, ANAMA worked with IEPF to conduct the
Mine Victims Needs Assessment project. The project
documented some of the challenges mine victims faced,
such as:
• They were in urgent need of financial assistance.
• The families that had lost their bread-winners in the
war needed assistance in establishing small-scale
businesses to support themselves.
• Mine victims often faced legal challenges, particularly
while trying to obtain their disabled status, citizenship registration card, etc.
• Both victims and people residing in mine-affected regions needed mine-risk education because accidents
continued to occur due to lack of information.
• Mine victims, their families and the local population
residing in mine-affected regions needed access to urgent medical attention following mine accidents.
• Mine victims required assistance in community and
mainstream-society reintegration.
In order to help mine victims overcome some of
these challenges, IEPF decided it should first bring the
mine victims together through the creation of an association. This association would serve as a platform where
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different initiatives and programs related to victim assistance could be developed through ideas contributed
by the mine victims themselves. Terter was the first region identified for bringing together victims because of
the high number of mine victims residing there. More
than half of the Terter region’s territory remains under
Armenian occupation, and landmines and unexploded
ordnance affect a large portion of the land.
Azerbaijan Mine Victims Association

The Azerbaijan Mine Victims Association was formally established and registered with the Azerbaijan
government in May 2007. Through its various achievements, the AMVA Terter branch was evaluated as a success by a committee within IEPF’s executive board, and
was highlighted by several international and local news
outlets. Some of the achievements from AMVA Terter’s
project activities were:
• More than 50 mine victims received assistance in
various legal matters, such as changing their federal
disability status so their pensions aligned with the severity of their injuries and documenting marital status to allow access to family benefits.
• 140 mine victims actively participated in various
training courses on small-scale business management, computer literacy and first aid.
• Three mine victims worked in various capacities in
the regional IEPF offices.
• 27 mine victims received advanced medical diagnoses from specialists, which helped them access federal
disability benefits.
• More than 30 mine victims received varying amounts
of social assistance.

In 2008, based on AMVA Terter’s
success in assisting mine victims,
the Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement in the U.S. Department
of State’s Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs (PM/WRA), AMVA’s original donor, financed the replication of
similar actions in the Fizuli and Agstafa regions, and assisted AMVA in
Terter with pursuing more activities.
Most of the AMVA-Terter members
joined the project working group, assisting mine victims with their legal
issues and also providing courses in
business training. Moreover, PM/
WRA approved seed capital for providing microcredit loans to the mine
victims. With this initial capital, the
IEPF established the Avrasia-Kredit,
Ltd., a non-banking organization distributing small loans to the less fortunate people in Agstafa, Fuzuli and
Terter. Additional financial donors,
including CredAgro, AzerStar and
AzerCredit, have increased the coffers of Avrasia-Kredit from an initial
donation of US$45,000 to $600,000
recently, and Avrasia-Kredit is
ranked among the top non-banking
organizations allocating microcredit
loans in the region, with more than
1,300 beneficiaries.
The mine victims who benefited
from microcredit loans were mainly concerned with the expansion of
their existing businesses, although
some were interested in starting new
businesses. IEPF and AMVA continued to provide business advice and
entrepreneurial skills training to the
mine victims and to a larger extent,
the inhabitants of the communities
in the regions. As the demand for
microcredit swelled, a need to create
a viable and sustainable source for

Trainees at the Terter Regional Vocational Training Center. Trainees are mine victims,
spouses or family members of war victims.
All photos courtesy of the author

job creation grew; hence, the IEPF
programs-development team established the Terter Regional Vocational Training Center.
The VTC was designed to not
only help mine victims and their
families gain the skills they needed
to become self-sufficient, but IEPF
suggested retired mine-clearance
workers were in need of retraining, as well. Due to the extremely
stressful nature of their work, mineclearance workers normally retire
from their positions at approximately 45 years of age; however, the law
does not regulate the retirement age.
IEPF noticed that many demining
retirees had a difficult time finding
other work and becoming financially
independent because of the difficulty in transferring their unique skills
into other professions. Vocational
training is needed to help them find
employment in other fields and reintegrate into society. Consequently,
deminers were encouraged to attend
the training courses.

Training Center Goals and Strategies

On 30 March 2010, the VTC officially announced its opening. IEPF,
in close collaboration with the Terter region’s local municipalities, organized the ceremony, and many
dignitaries attended, including PM/
WRA’s Azerbaijan Country Program
Manager, Katherine Baker, and Michael Gaunt, the military attaché
for the U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan,
along with a large number of community members. ANAMA’s Information Manager, Murad Rahimov,
also attended the opening ceremony
to express ANAMA’s desire to ensure
mine-free zones in Azerbaijan’s border territories. During the ceremony,
Vudadi Isayev, the head of the local
authority, expressed his delight with
the continuous financial support of
the United States.
The Terter Regional Vocational
Training Center is unique, teaching
food and nutrition skills; domestic
skills such as painting, carpet weaving and decorative design; and tech-
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tion in which learners put into
practice all theorized learning
processes. The learners begin to
develop actual vocational skills
in this stage.
• Informal learning: At this stage,
learners are encouraged to practice skills outside VTC’s walls,
through their daily work and social, family or leisure activities.
VTC’s Operations and Activities

IEPF Chairman Umud Mirzayev and the project working group meet with staff of the Terter Regional Vocational Training Center.

nical skills like electrical wiring, carpentry, and
advertising and graphic design. VTC also provides training on agricultural practices, business skills and microfinance management. The
first participants were drawn from the Terter
region, but VTC expects others will come from
the Agdam, Goranboy and Goygol regions.
Presently, the two-story VTC building has various offices, restroom facilities and two training
rooms that can seat up to 20 persons per room.
In the future, VTC will enroll war victims
and retired deminers, irrespective of their locations. To accommodate the needs of these
remote victims, VTC envisions having approximately six lodging rooms for participants and trainers from more distant regions
of Azerbaijan, as well as a conference hall that
can seat approximately 120 people.
During the opening ceremony, the chairman of IEPF, Umud Mirzayev, outlined the
VTC’s overall goals, which include developing income-generating skills for war victims,
their family members and retired humanitarian mine-action personnel, as well as integrating those trained into mainstream society. To
succeed, IEPF will assist with constructing and
equipping the VTC, operating the VTC (train-
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ing component), and finding job placements
or business opportunities for the mine victims
and the retired deminers.
Various local and international specialists
and experts were involved in creating the VTC’s
training curriculum. The curriculum designed
for VTC is modeled after best practices recommended by the International Labour Organization, and IEPF also has adopted several
curriculum materials from Western Australia’s
Department of Education and Training and various similar institutions in the United States.
Although VTC will use local experts as trainers, it will also work with established international organizations, particularly U.N. agencies
with similar practices.
The training procedure followed by the
trainers will be conducted using three learning approaches as outlined in the document,
“Professional Development Framework for Vocational Skills of Vocational Education and
Training Practitioners.”1 The three teaching
methods are:
• Formal learning: a program of instruction
emphasizing theory through classroom materials and shared documents
• Non-formal learning: a program of instruc-

In the first week of May 2010,
VTC officially opened its operations, with the commencement of
four vocational training courses including carpet weaving, food and
nutrition, advertising and graphic design, and agricultural practices. Participants were from 18 to
50 years of age. Most of the male
participants joined the agricultural courses, while the women took
the carpet weaving and food and
nutrition classes. The advertising
and graphic design course attracted younger participants, both male
and female. The first group of VTC
participants were either mine victims or the spouse/other family
member of a war victim; two mineclearance workers enrolled in the
subsequent class.
As VTC’s main focus is providing participants with the skills to
help them attain gainful employment, the VTC manager will closely
collaborate with IEPF to find suitable places where the VTC graduates’ newly acquired skills will be
needed. Some of the graduates will
be encouraged to start their own
small businesses or even joint ventures. Microcredit loans from Avrasia-Kredit are easily accessible to
VTC graduates.

One of the participants in the carpet weaving class displays her skills on knitting.

IEPF plans to expand and improve
the VTC. Hopefully, international
agencies and organizations will take
advantage of the unique building
housing the VTC. War victims, refugees, internally displaced people, local communities and deminers still
need assistance. The VTC is a collective community resource, functioning to benefit the general public. In
addition, VTC plans to diversify to
also include the promotion of agricultural practices as one of its core
activities, since this is the primary
trade of the region’s inhabitants. Although VTC has taught agricultural classes for quite some time, it plans
to extend the training program to its
commercial farm and provide onthe-job training for mine victims and
their family members. The sales generated from the farm would be used
for salaries and running the farm.
see endnotes page 80
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Mine Action Development Funding
in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and explosive remnants of war, but the need for development in these communities
often trumps clearance and mine-risk education activities. In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
where clearance activities are expected to continue until 2019, the Swiss Development
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Cooperation and Handicap International are exploring new ways for mine action to
integrate development efforts into more traditional mine-action efforts.

FEATURE

Mine action seeks to eliminate the lingering effects of contamination from landmines

by Michael Carrier [ Handicap International ] and Dr. John Powell
[ Community and Countryside Research Institute ]

T

he Bosnian War took place from 1992–1995 during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and
principally involved Serbian ethnic groups fighting against Muslim and Croatian groups in Bosnia. During the war, Bosnian and Croatian groups also turned
against one another for the small part of Bosnia still in
their control. As a result of these bitter conflicts, Bosnia
and Herzegovina is one of the most mine-affected countries in the world.
Despite massive humanitarian mine-action funding
during the past 15 years, the suspected hazardous area
covers 1,620 square kilometers (626 square miles) or 3.1
percent of BiH.1 The development of a new Mine Action
Strategy (2009–19) aiming for a country “free of mines”
by 2019 means it is officially recognized that the struggle to remove landmines will continue for at least another decade in BiH. Humanitarian donors will not likely
commit funding in the required quantities to achieve
the mine-free objective within that timeframe. Mineaction organizations, therefore, will need to use funding
that is specified for more general development activities
and operate mine-specific development activities in parallel with humanitarian assistance.
This article reflects on a pilot project currently being
implemented in BiH. Funded by the Swiss Development
Cooperation and Handicap International, the project
aims to develop and test innovative ways to improve the
links between mine action and development. This endeavor provides an opportunity to explore how the use
of development funding can have a beneficial impact on
more traditional mine-action efforts.2

Development Approach Complements Mine Action

The term “mine action and development” does not
mean “mine action” versus “development.” As a country moves from an humanitarian crisis to a development phase, a transfer takes place from the traditional
mine-action humanitarian assistance to a mine-action
development approach. This evolution potentially opens
the door to new types of cooperation as a development
donor may support “development activities” involving
mine action, whereas it would not support demining
activities alone.3 Such donors would expect any mineaction intervention to be an integral part of, or at least
closely linked with, a development project. Funding is
unlikely to be earmarked specifically for mine action
but more likely to be based on sustainable effects that
any type of intervention, including mine action, would
have on identified development priorities. Mine-action
organizations will have a difficult time applying for this
type of funding without stronger cooperation with other development actors. On the other hand, without a
mine-action contribution, development actors would
not be able to undertake work addressing social exclusion of a mine-affected population. Mine action—often
thought to be dominated by military personnel and
ways of thinking—and development stakeholders—often viewed by those in mine action as “civilian”—will
therefore need to work together if they want to secure
development money for mine-contaminated areas.
Cooperation between the mine-action and development worlds can be difficult and raise a number of questions, ranging from the existential “what is a ‘mine-action
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Mine-affected inhabitants actively involved in reconstructing
the existing road leading to the community of Burmazi, Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
Photo courtesy of Handicap International

development approach’?” to practical issues such as
“who is in charge?” Linking mine action and development inevitably creates friction and requires both groups
to be aware of their differing needs and requirements in
order to achieve synergistic benefits from linked activities. A key finding in the BiH project discussed below is
that most of the traditional development and mine-action
interventions do not need any major institutional modification, as long as individual organizations focus on
their own mandates within a coherent program of activity. Project outcomes suggest the following:
• Development donors will select the most relevant, efficient, impact-oriented and sustainable project, irrespective of whether a mine-action element is included
• A mine-action center can effectively supervise the
five official pillars of mine action without the need to
control development interventions in mine-contaminated areas.4
• All practitioners should maintain leadership of their
core activities, while at the same time creating stronger linkages with other stakeholders.
Strong project management is required, with both
sides involved from the beginning in a process of project
planning that identifies clear goals, actions and evaluation criteria to measure overall effectiveness. An integrated approach requires:
• A risk-benefit approach in which risk assessment incorporates immediate local community social and
economic objectives within long-term regional and
national goals. The current risk-assessment approach
needs modification.
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• Demining and other mine-action operations prioritized on the basis of local needs. Prioritization
already occurs, but integrating demining more frequently with development priorities is needed.
• Local-level processes to enable identification of social and economic benefits. These practices might
need to be created from scratch but can be staged
to identify key priorities early on and more complex
concerns later.
• Mine action (e.g., fencing, education) delivered
alongside development activities (provision of employment and income assistance, enhanced local services, road rehabilitation, etc.) requires a higher level
of communication between mine-action and development organizations.
• Institutional processes enabling compromise between differing objectives. Mine action and development must adapt institutional goals and practices to
allow for cooperation and coordination.
The emphasis is twofold, on both project planning
and management, and on a deeper understanding of
community development needs. The approach may result in a slower start to mine-action activities on the
ground, but the outcome would be more effective intervention that simultaneously develops a community and
releases it from the wider impacts of mines.
When the BiH project started in 2007, local community members from the mine-affected municipalities of Stolac and Berkovici identified road rehabilitation
as a key priority. They realized that better accessibility
within their community was necessary to obtain benefits from future mine-action intervention. Mine action
would release land for agricultural purposes, thereby increasing local production, while the rehabilitated road
would ensure that the agricultural products could be
taken to regional markets, thus enhancing local income
streams.
The Best Way to a Mine-free World?

The concept of mine action needs enlargement in order to encapsulate a country’s evolution from humanitarian needs and immediate survival to development
and sustainable livelihood, as well as a concept that
enables movement from a risk-focused to an impactoriented approach. Instead of taking the traditional
mine-free approach—where all possible resources focus
on removing all mines before development can occur—
an intermediary mine-impact-free goal may be needed.

Image courtesy of Navid Bulbulija

Questions then arise as to what such
a term might mean on the ground
and how a potential donor might interpret it.
We define mine-impact-free as
freedom for local communities to
attain sustainable livelihoods (i.e.,
economic, social and environmental benefits) provided through two
broad sets of actions: first, by removing fear and uncertainty about
what actions can and cannot be undertaken in a specific area, and second, through support for developing
alternative livelihoods. Providing
concrete examples of links between
traditional mine-action outputs—
mine-risk education, humanitarian
demining, victim assistance, stockpile destruction and advocacy—and
human-development goals will ultimately be more convincing to potential donors.
The adoption of an intermediate
mine-impact-free target would undoubtedly delay the ideal time when
all mines would be fully eradicated,
as resources formerly devoted to demining would be diverted to social
and economic development activi-

ty. In the long run, however, it may
be the best possible way toward a
mine-impact-free world, as it could
secure longer-term funding and ensure mine action is only undertaken
if the community benefits. In addition, to obtain local community support by enabling current generations
to engage in rewarding and sustainable employment is more likely to
occur than waiting for some future
promised land that may never materialize in their lifetime.
Development: An Effective Response

If the concept of mine action is
expanded beyond its current narrow
focus on simply removing mines to
consider a wider set of options for
managing and removing the negative impacts of mines first, development intervention could become a
very effective mine-risk response.
More than 15 years after the conflict, the majority of new mine/UXO
victims in BiH are adults entering
into known hazardous areas for economic reasons.5 Without sustainable employment alternatives, they
face bitter choices between neglect-

ing their families and risking their
lives to meet their basic needs. Evidence from a field study implemented through this pilot project in May
2009 in the mine-affected communities of Stolac and Berkovici reveals
that 24 percent of households surveyed continue to use marked mine
areas. These are people fully aware
of the risk, but they see entering the
minefields as the only alternative to
sustaining their incomes; therefore,
no amount of risk education will
curtail their actions. Project efforts
to integrate mine action and development in these communities have
revealed a local capacity to engage
in bottom-up development activities
that enhance the inhabitants’ social
and economic lives, largely through
redirecting the focus away from
mine removal and instead toward
prioritizing development activities
in safe areas.
Prioritizing action, based on
the limited resources available in a
mined area can ensure that the most
important local issues are dealt with
first. Mine-risk management has a
role to play, including the traditional
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Despite the request of the Handicap International team, this local mine-affected inhabitant refused to move out of the marked suspected hazardous area.
Photo courtesy of Handicap International

mine-action threat-reduction activities (demining, fencing, marking),
but in order to ensure behavioral
changes, it must also link standard
mine-risk education with actions to
create development alternatives. In
BiH for example, providing an uncontaminated community space
for collecting wood, or temporarily exchanging suspected hazardous
areas with safe agricultural land until clearance is completed, would alleviate financial pressures on locals
who knowingly use mine-affected
land. Thus, these activities would be
safe, cost-effective and complementary approaches to mine action.
In the municipality of Berkovici,
an association of hunters is one of
the most high-risk groups in BiH
and is currently involved in an innovative mine-risk management approach. After being accredited to
conduct mine-risk education and
carrying out a participatory, community-needs assessment, the association identified priorities for
development, demining and minerisk education. The priorities are
being formalized into the existing
mine-action system while a specific
development alternative starts. With
the support of local institutions,
hunters will manage a specific hunting zone in a safe area, mark safe
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paths that any type of visitor could
use (not just hunters) and promote
the area to local inhabitants, as well
as foreigners, in order to enhance
the area’s tourism. Such an approach
requires a deeper understanding of
local communities and how they
function but will potentially enable
access to development funding for
a more holistic form of mine-risk
management intervention.
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Conclusion

The traditional humanitarianmine-action assistance alone cannot
fully erase the impact of landmines
and the related social exclusion factors evident in post-conflict zones.
Traditional technical mine-action inputs, such as mine clearance
mine-risk education and survivor
assistance activities, are not sufficient. In order to improve quality of
life and access development funding, mine action must also become
part of a development response. It
must include the setting of intermediary mine-impact-free targets
and consider a wider set of intervention measures, from the recognized
standards of mine action to innovative actions including institutional
change, community appraisal, and
support for alternative social and
economic opportunities.
see endnotes page 80
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Mine-action Funding: GICHD
Survey of Donor Countries
A recent survey of donors conducted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining found that, while short-term donor support remains strong, levels of funding
may decrease and become more unpredictable over the coming years.
by Jean Devlin [ Consultant ] and Sharmala Naidoo [ GICHD ]

I

n May and June 2010, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining commissioned a
survey of 25 donors that have contributed to mineaction programs. The study’s objective was to gain insight into the donors’ motivation in funding mine-action
programs, the issues that play a role in driving their continued support and the factors that will influence future
funding. The findings indicate that short-term commitment and financial support remain strong. However, the
sustainability of the current level of support for mine action beyond 2015 is difficult to ascertain.
A few donors responding to the survey indicated that
in the near future they would be subject to program reviews, multi-year approvals for the renewal of funding
for mine action or broader-defined programs that include mine action, anticipated budget cuts this year or
in the next, and planned reductions in expenditures in
mine action. Nevertheless, The majority of donors responding indicated that their commitment level would
stay about the same for the next two to three years. Support will likely decrease beyond the next five years, with
increasing unpredictability in funding. The study concluded that if less money will flow to mine action in the
future, more cost-effective methods that result in concrete progress will be necessary.
In the future, a number of factors will converge, posing challenges and offering opportunities to officials
concerned with mine action. Growing competition
for financial resources in the broader peace and security field, a more pronounced desire to integrate mine
action in the security-development nexus, reduced human resources in donor administrations dedicated to
mine action and greater affected-country ownership

and capacity for dealing with residual mine and explosive-remnants-of-war contamination demand new approaches to a continual problem. Officials will need to
work on strategies for integrating capacity-building into
government priorities in affected countries, ensuring
maximum protection of at-risk populations, reducing
the size of suspected areas and concentrating on priority areas for socioeconomic development.
These elements constitute a strong argument for sustaining dialogue between donors and affected countries
on how to assist the countries in their gradual takeover
of Ottawa Convention responsibilities and obligations.
The current explorations, such as those of GICHD into
the best way of instituting this dialogue, are a positive
step in this direction.
What Led to the Current Study?

Mine action has traditionally benefited from generous donor funding. According to the Landmine Monitor
Report 2009, total funding for mine action amounted to
US$626.5 million through May 2009. Of this amount,
$517.8 million1 came from international sources and
$108.7 million from mine-affected countries themselves. Despite recent adjustments, this amounted to
some of the highest levels of investment to reduce the
landmine threat since financial contributions to mine
action were first recorded in 1992. Despite minor fluctuations in donor data, the Landmine Monitor has also
recorded constant growth in annual mine-action contributions since 1996. Contrary to this encouraging
trend, concerns remain about the effectiveness of mineaction programs, the uneven distribution of support
and the sustainability of funding. While funding for
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mine action has remained relatively high and donor commitment has
been positive, there is some concern
that funding over the coming years
might be limited and difficult to secure. This is particularly true for less
developed countries that have applied for deadline extensions to fulfill their clearance obligations.

der equality and care for survivors
than on the number of mines found
and destroyed.
Unless there is an unexpected
turn of events, donors are unlikely to launch new initiatives and increase mine-action funding levels.

calls made by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the
Accra Agenda of Action 3 for donors to focus their development
assistance on a smaller number
of partner countries. It is also in
line with the desire expressed by

Methodology

The study carried out between
May and June 2010 consisted of a
written questionnaire sent to 25
donors, including the European
Commission, as well as telephone
interviews with 10 donors selected
from the study group.2 The findings
are based on the answers 18 donors
(85.3 percent of total external funding) provided and a review of donor
documents and websites.
Key Findings

1. Broader environment and mine
action.
Even though the Ottawa Convention remains the central anchor of
donor policy-making, it is no longer the only point of reference. Most
donors view mine action as part of
broader development cooperation,
which includes humanitarian assistance. Donors no longer view mine
contamination strictly as an emergency issue requiring an immediate
humanitarian response.
2. Policy and strategic planning for
mine action.
Donors are pragmatic in the way
they relate to mine action. Donor
policy language is now more nuanced and realistic in terms of what
is achievable. Thinking has shifted toward placing greater emphasis
on socioeconomic impact, protection, reintegration, livelihoods, gen-
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A female deminer in Jordan.
Photo courtesy of Erik Tollefsen/GICHD

This could well be the preview of a
leveling off in programming. It also
presents a challenge and an opportunity for mine-affected countries
and mine-action operators to adjust
programming during these strategically important next five years, in
order to not only prioritize funding,
but also to improve efficiency and
transparency in mine action.
Donors are increasingly concentrating their support on a smaller
number of countries. Fifteen out of
18 donors said that to varying degrees, the countries receiving assistance for mine action are also
partner countries for other forms
of aid. This is consistent with the

donors and recipients to ensure all
government departments involved
offer a coherent and consistent approach in providing assistance.
For fragile states and states coming out of conflict, this means
placing greater attention on ensuring that security and development
programs are planned in tandem,
which further supports the argument not to isolate mine action.
Putting these principles into
action is not an easy task. Donors generally favor coordination
among themselves and mine-affected countries but are not proactive
in pursuing this coordination. They
tend to respond to invitations from

national authorities to become part of a joint evaluation or
assessment rather than initiate the project (with the notable exception of Japan which has emphasized this aspect in
its recent aid policy). They remain divided about instituting
new structures like a standing committee on international
cooperation and assistance.
3. Budget and program management.
The budget process varies considerably from country to country. In most cases, mine-action allocations
are not highlighted as specific line items in budgets, but
rather are subsumed in humanitarian, development, security or other related programming. Eight donors of
the 18 that provided answers choose to dedicate a portion of their budget allocations for mine action or a mix
of mine action and ERW/cluster munitions. Two of these
donors dedicate part of their budget allocation for mine
action for a specific purpose such as victim assistance.
The majority of mine-action funding is channeled
bilaterally (directed to a specific country), typically
through a multilateral organization, a nongovernmental organization or an operator. Most donors provide
some un-earmarked funding, for example, core funding through multilateral channels (the United Nations
Mine Action Service, GICHD), and through NGOs (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Geneva Call,
International Committee of the Red Cross), but these
amounts are substantially smaller. The preference for bilateral funding is based on foreign policy and strategic
reasons, as well as a desire to focus aid on those countries most in need. This partly explains why the majority of
mine-action funding focuses on less than 10 mine-affected
countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Cambodia, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Lebanon and Sudan.1
Within donor agencies, the growth of competing
fields, such as peacebuilding, security-sector reform,
and conflict prevention and recovery, have affected
mine-action programs. Competition for time and budgets has become a serious challenge. As a result, fewer
people are tasked with primarily mine-action responsibilities than in previous years, and there has been a rapid
turnover of mine-action personnel, resulting in a loss of
corporate memory and in-house expertise.
Donors typically channel their support for mine action
through a small number of intermediaries with limited
direct support provided to national mine-action authorities. Of the 18 responses, only two donors mentioned
clearly that their funding decisions took consultations

A village development committee in Cambodia.
Photo courtesy of Sharmala Naidoo/GICHD

with mine-affected governments into consideration.
This is at odds with the general trend by donors calling
for greater national ownership and enhanced national
mine-action capacity.
The main criteria that donors take into account
when considering funding proposals and making
funding decisions include:
• Measurement and prioritization of needs, i.e., focusing on clearing areas that yield the most measurable benefit
• National ownership and capacity
• Commitment to meeting Ottawa obligations
• Measuring the developmental outcomes resulting
from mine action
• Measuring the experience and the capacity of local and international partners
• Aid effectiveness factors (coherence, coordination,
sustainability, capacity development, etc.)
• Gender equality
• Proven effectiveness and experience of local and
national mine-action programs and agencies
4. Relationships with mine-affected countries and
mine-action organizations.
Due to competing demands and reduced capacity,
donor engagement at international mine-action meetings and at field level is weak. Donors typically function in response mode, reacting to proposals submitted
to them as opposed to developing their own programs.
Visits from donors are few and far apart, and are typically for monitoring and evaluation purposes. Most of
the liaison work is left to embassies.
Donors tend to have a light footprint in host countries in terms of informing mine-affected governments
of their decisions to fund a mine-action project, with
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the exception of the United States
and the European Commission. Direct contacts with central agencies
occur more frequently when countries integrate mine action with development, such as in the case of
Australia and Sweden.
5. Funding trends and prospects.
While the total flow of official assistance to developing countries may
still be growing despite the current
economic climate, there is little evidence that mine-action funding will
follow this trend. On the contrary,
mine action’s relative importance,
combined with mounting donor interest in other global challenges, and
the fact that the Ottawa Convention
has delivered tangible results, will
probably mark a turning point in
the next three to five years. Beyond
the next five years, the picture becomes difficult to predict. However,
it is quite plausible that funding will
take a further downward trend.
Donor reaction to the recent extension process is prudent. As other
countries join the extension process
with their list of additional resources needed, the gap between needs
and available resources will likely
widen considerably.
In terms of change between
channels, programming types and
modalities, donors do not anticipate any major changes in the way
they do business. Donors are open
to integrating mine-action projects
in broader development programs
if mine-affected countries take the
lead in raising the issue. Opportunities within donor administrations
for initiating new funding avenues
for mine action are marginal.4
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In terms of commitment to support mine action, 17 donors stated
their commitments (which differ
from actual expenditures) would
hold until the end of the current
funding period (usually part of an
official strategy, a mine-action plan
or a public commitment of some
sort). Donor funding for mine action may well have peaked in 2008–
09 and has reached a new plateau for
the immediate future (2010–11). In
the medium-term (2012–15), funding will likely fall to a lower plateau.
This situation could change during
the 2014–15 period, as some major donors review their multi-year,
mine-action assistance.
Many reasons explain this slow
but predictable trend toward gradually reduced funding levels including lack of transparency and
progress on clearance, lack of value for funds invested, extension
requests with unreasonable financing estimates, budget restrictions,
and competition for limited funding. Many donors and experts, however, contend that it is not the level
of funding that counts as much as
the effectiveness of assistance programs, socioeconomic impact, national authorities demonstrating
ownership and pace of progress in
land release.
The full report will be available for
download through the GICHD website
(http://gichd.org) by late 2010. For further information, contact Sharmala
Naidoo at s.naidoo@gichd.org.
see endnotes page 80

The United Nations Portfolio
of Mine Action Projects
In Xieng Khouang, Lao PDR, an all-female demining team assesses and
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clears unexploded ordnance-contaminated land. In Bogotá, Colombia, a team
of practitioners nationalizes a plan to train local health personnel about the
psychosocial needs of explosive-remnants-of-war victims. In Banja Luka, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, primary schoolchildren attend educational puppet shows about
small-arms-and-light-weapons risks. At the heart of each initiative is a collaborative
resource-mobilization system called the Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, and in
2010 it gives life to 277 projects in 27 countries.
by Chad McCoull [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]

T

he U.N. Portfolio of Mine Action Projects allows government agencies and
nongovernmental and international organizations in the field to publicize their plans
to deal with local mine-action issues and to
seek financial assistance for these plans. The
annual appeal also serves as a compendium of
global mine-action accomplishments and as a
catalog for potential donors to browse. In addition, it is a reference and capacity-building
tool, providing a snapshot of global funding requirements, the status of countries’/territories’
strategies and whose submission process helps
appealing agencies hone their skills in proposal
writing and strategic planning.
Simply submitting a project to the Portfolio, however, rarely gets it funded. In reality,
the politics of aligning voluntary donors’ interests with those of the manifold field agents
often involves complex negotiations. Routine
communications between stakeholders are necessary to strategize the yearly process of approving, funding, facilitating and publicizing
country projects.
The process begins when an appealing
agency identifies an outstanding need for
which it requires external funding. For example,
DanChurchAid, operating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, may lack the resourc-

es and personnel necessary to clear minefields
in the Katanga province. The appealing agency
must carefully articulate and submit a request
to its respective Country Portfolio Coordinator who then liaises with the Portfolio Team
at the U.N. headquarters. Getting indexed in
the Portfolio requires that an appealing agency
work with its implementing partners to formalize a detailed project proposal. In this example,
DanChurchAid arranges for one implementing partner to provide mine-detection dogs and
mechanical assets while another implementing
partner conducts advocacy activities.
The U.N. Headquarters Portfolio Team—an
interagency group of staff from United Nations
Mine Action Service, United Nations Development Programme and UNICEF—vets the
project proposals to ensure consistency and
coherence with the stated requirements by the
Country Portfolio Team. Finally, donor representatives select projects to fund, specifying
budget timelines and accountability measures.
Throughout the predetermined duration of
project implementation, the applicant (in the
above example, DanChurchAid) and its partners report progress to all relevant stakeholders. Once a year, the Portfolio Team publishes a
new Portfolio online, refreshing the register of
new requests and ongoing projects.
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Thirteen Editions and Counting

Originally called the Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects in 1998, the Portfolio first arose from UNMAS’
imperative to appraise and monitor the global mine
problem’s funding requirements. The first edition only
acknowledged official U.N. programs, eight integrated
mine-action programs and 10 countries’ proposed projects lists. During the first five years, increasing numbers
of NGOs and national authorities began to participate,
some even actively replacing U.N. officials as Country

instrumental in accommodating ad hoc electronic updates and biannual progress reports. According to the
Portfolio Team, such efforts promote greater local and
national ownership of the Portfolio process and support
capacity development in terms of outreach efforts, especially to donors.
Linking Mine Action with Development

Following the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention,
victim rates have receded, consequently enabling the
global mine-action community to pay greater heed to
issues of community development. Recent studies have
proven the importance of linking mine action with development,2 and an increasing number of mine-action
entities have begun aligning their efforts with the U.N.
Millennium Development Goals3 and Development Assistance Frameworks.4
The Portfolio is a testament to this trend. According to the Portfolio Team, “The benefits of mine action
are seldom singular. A road made passable reduces victims, but also promotes the return of displaced populations and stimulates trade.”5 With priorities shifting
toward development-conscious mine action, the Portfolio has reflected a “more explicit elaboration of development aspects, where they may previously not have been
highlighted.” In recent years, appealing agencies have
increasingly partnered with development practitioners
to attract the interest of progressive donors.
Matching Agencies with Donors

Cover of the 2010 Portfolio of Mine Action
courtesy of the United Nations

Portfolio Coordinators.1 Since its inception, the proposal process has evolved from a top-down approach to a
decentralized approach in which field agencies chiefly
assess needs and draft proposals. Today more than ever,
the national strategies, priorities and coordinated processes of the 95 appealing agencies currently included
in the Portfolio guide its content.
More recent in its history has been the 2007 debut
of the invaluable Automated Portfolio System, which
streamlines data submission and funds tracking and reporting in real time. The web-based AP System has been
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The track records of some appealing agencies show
years of experience while others have only recently begun to grapple with mine-action issues. Despite such
complexity, the United Nations and donors have been
encouraged by the increase in national authorities asserting their right to oversee their own countries' multifarious activities.
Some appealing agencies have held the misconception that simply participating in the Portfolio will guarantee them funding from the international community.
Programs that have not received funding in a particular
year have thereafter withdrawn their proposals. While
the Portfolio ultimately strives to connect the donor and
implementer and serves as a reference tool for many donors, both parties must align regional and topical priorities before plans can be discussed. For this reason,
not every project can receive funding. In 2010, for example, most projects did not receive funding. Out of the

US$589 million requested for the
combined projects, only $24 million
was secured at the time of publication, amounting to a record shortfall
of $565 million. In December 2009,
UNMAS director Maxwell Kerley
announced, “It is unlikely with our
best efforts that funding would be attained, but it does not mean that the
job won’t get done—it will just take
longer and more people will die.”6
The United Nations hypothesizes that some of the reasons for this
shortfall include deficient reporting,
the global economic downturn and
new directions in donors’ earmarking decisions. In addition, while
the Portfolio has expanded from 10
countries in 1998 to 27 countries in
2010, donor interest in the mineaction field has stagnated. Though
global support for mine action has
remained constant, forecasts from
The Landmine Monitor Report7 indi-

for its flexibility in expressing the dynamic needs of a particular community. Japan, one of the major donors,
annually references the Portfolio to
inform earmarking decisions. Donors also gain greater awareness of
the plights of lesser publicized countries, such as Mauritania.
When stakeholders meet to
solve a problem, assess local needs
and strategize a plan of action, the
Portfolio empowers these parties to
communicate uniformly and globally. According to the U.N. Portfolio
Team, Albania often cites the Portfolio
as invaluable for coordinating partners and attracting funds. In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, all national authorities, international agencies and NGOs found the
Portfolio to be a useful means to coordinate activities. Amid Sudan’s civil war, the call to compile the Portfolio
brought together stakeholders from

“It is unlikely with our best efforts that funding would be attained, but it does not mean
that the job won’t get done—it will just
take longer and more people will die.”

cate that donors may decrease funding in future years.8 To gain donor
attention, the Portfolio Team recommends that appealing agencies
respond by “recognizing the wider
funding interests of traditional and
non-traditional mine action donors
and to partner with wider thematic
and geographic funding sources.”5
Building upon Assets

Donors praise the Portfolio both
for its utility as a reference tool and

both the North and South in confidence-building roundtables, long before the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.9
These success stories underscore
the prospect that the Portfolio will
continue to serve the mine-action
sector as a permanent fixture. Currently, the Portfolio Team is reviewing inefficiencies and assets, listening
to stakeholder feedback and improving objectives for the upcoming years.
The 2011 Portfolio is expected to be

delayed for some months as a result of
this review. To learn more about the
Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, visit
http://tinyurl.com/36gfzuy.
Note: Information presented in this
article was provided by the UNDP,
UNICEF and UNMAS, members of
the UN HQ Portfolio Team, interviewed in July and August 2010.5
see endnotes page 81
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The Mine Action Programme
of Afghanistan
The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan, coordinated by the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, faces a unique set of challenges in combating the national
mine/explosive-remnants-of-war contamination problem. The ongoing war and changing political climate force the country to adapt its mine-action plan to meet new demands as they emerge. The following summary of MAPA’s activities highlights these
challenges and their implications for the continued humanitarian effort in Afghanistan.
by Dr. Mohammed Haider Reza [ MACCA ]

T

he Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan is one of the oldest and largest
mine-action programs in the world.1
Coordinated by the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, more than 10,000
individuals in commercial and noncommercial entities work in Afghanistan’s mine-action
field.2 MAPA’s implementing partners vary in
size from large organizations with thousands
of employees to smaller organizations with
few personnel. MAPA covers all mine-action
pillars, 3 including demining (survey, marking
and clearance), mine-risk education, victim assistance and advocacy.
MAPA began in 1988 as a United Nations
Office of Humanitarian Affairs coordinated
operation based in Peshawar, Pakistan. After
the Taliban’s fall in 2001, the new government
of Afghanistan delegated program responsibility to the United Nations to coordinate
mine-action activities in the country. Since its
inception, MAPA has grown in size and expanded its area of operation to every mineaffected province. In 2000, MAPA received
only US$17 million4 in funding; since 2001
the overall budget of bilateral and multilateral
funding has averaged $140 million per annum.
The additional funding received since 2001
has allowed for some significant achievements.
For example, the number of victims has been
reduced by 75 percent from its high point in
2002, when the International Committee of the
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Red Cross reported more than 1,200 casualties
from landmines, unexploded ordnance and
cluster munitions.5 More than 12,000 minefields have been cleared and the land has been
made available for productive use. The initial
priorities were to clear the areas blocking access to schools, universities, hospitals, residential areas and farmlands. Although many of
these priorities have been completed, as more
refugees return and resettle in Afghanistan
and the country slowly works toward building
a modern infrastructure, mine action will continue to play a crucial role in the country’s postwar development, such as in the clearance that
was necessary to allow electricity lines to run
from Tajikistan to Kabul. Despite the fact that
the amount of funding received has increased,
current funding is insufficient for Afghanistan,
as it is in many other countries, if Ottawa Convention and Afghan Compact deadlines are to
be met on time.
As the number of known minefields is reduced, MACCA works with implementing
partners to annually review the planning criteria against which priorities are set and publishes an Integrated Operational Framework6
detailing these priorities. This handbook outlines mine-action sector policies, details data
analysis of the current hazard areas and contains a compilation of the aspirations of all
implementing partners. Although more than
600 square kilometers (231.7 square miles)

of contaminated area remain, MAPA can eliminate high-impact hazards relatively quickly, clearing approximately 80 square kilometers (30.9 square
miles) each year. Furthermore, having cleared the
high-impact minefields in the last 20 years, MACCA
and its implementing partners must begin to consider how to restructure over time in order to meet
the next decade’s challenges. For example, 40 percent of the existing contamination covers relatively
large areas, with low-density contamination of minimal-metal anti-tank mines outside urban centers.
Although once not considered a priority, the impact
of these minefields on Afghanistan is increasing as
the country’s infrastructure and industry develop,
particularly those associated with natural resources. Therefore, the priority for clearance of these sites
must also adapt.

Mine-risk education is now taught by 17,000 trained Ministry
of Education teachers throughout Afghanistan.
all Photos courtesy of MAPA

Afghanistan’s Goals and End States

In 2003, Afghanistan became a signatory to the
Ottawa Convention which commits the country to:
• Clear all emplaced anti-personnel mines by 2013
• Destroy all known AP-mine stockpiles by 2007
(this goal was achieved in October 2007)
• Provide mine-risk education to Afghans and assist mine survivors

In addition, mine-action goals were included in the Afghan Compact, namely:
• Land area contaminated by mines and ERW
will be reduced by 70 percent by March 2011.
• All stockpiled AP mines will be located and
destroyed by March 2007.
Future Goals

The Afghan government’s end-state vision is
“a country free from landmines and explosive
remnants of war, where people and communities live in a safe environment conducive to national development, and where landmine and
ERW survivors are fully integrated in the society and thus have their rights and needs recognized and fulfilled.”7
In order to realize the end-state vision, the
following end goals must be achieved:
Goal 1: Demining. The end goal for demining will be achieved when all known mine/
ERW-contaminated areas have been cleared.
Once this goal is achieved, an effective demining capability will continue and respond to
unknown residual risk and raise public awareness. Mapping of cleared areas will be complete
and accurate, and this data will be available as
needed to the public and designated institutions. All post-clearance documentation will
be complete, and all cleared land will be handed over in accordance with national standards.
Goal 2: Mine/ERW-Risk Education. The end
goal for MRE will be achieved when a comprehensive and sustainable system is in place to
educate and raise awareness throughout communities nationwide regarding the residual
mines/ERW threats. This includes providing
the public with sufficient information to recognize and report these suspicious items to the
appropriate authorities.
Goal 3: Stockpile Destruction. The end goal
for mine-stockpile destruction will be achieved
when all known illegal, abandoned or otherwise
unwanted munitions are destroyed or disposed
of in addition to the AP-mine stockpile destruction already completed.
Goal 4: Mine/ERW-Survivor Assistance.
The end goal for mine/ERW-survivor assistance
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Creative mine-risk awareness techniques capture children’s imaginations

will be achieved when mine/ERW survivors
are reintegrated into Afghan society, with support provided through a national system that
incorporates the rights and needs of people
with disabilities.
Goal 5: Advocacy and Coordination. The
end goal for advocacy and coordination will
be achieved when relevant institutions and
civil society cooperate and support the fulfillment of Afghan commitments to mine/
ERW eradication and acknowledge the importance of mine action for communities and national development.
Meeting Milestones

Clearly, the challenge of reaching these
end states in a country as contaminated as
Afghanistan, and where conflict is ongoing
in many areas, is a major one. Nonetheless,
MAPA has met a number of significant milestones. In addition to the achievements highlighted earlier and the completion of stockpile
destruction in line with the Afghan Compact
goals, significant steps have been made in the
areas of MRE and victim assistance. These are
the two areas where the transition to the government of Afghanistan has made the most
significant progress.
Mine/ERW-risk education messages have
been incorporated into the national education curriculum, and more than 17,000 Ministry of Education teachers have been trained
and provided the resources to teach MRE in
classrooms. In order to ensure the sustainable
quality of this teaching, Child Protection Officers in all provinces have been certified as
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MRE trainers and also trained in monitoring
and evaluation. MACCA currently supports
this transition by providing the external monitoring and quality management of this system.
The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, and the Ministry of Public
Health are leading victim/disability assistance
activities, ensuring that landmine survivors
and others with disabilities have their rights and
needs addressed alongside all Afghan citizens.

The program is proving to be a successful way of
enabling access to less secure areas as local recruitment and strong community involvement enhances deminers’ security. An additional benefit of the
community-based demining program is the economic boost provided to the small rural communities through the deminers’ wages and other income,
and through building rentals, etc., over a two-year
period, which empowers them to take advantage of
land development once it has been cleared.

Conclusion

MAPA and its partners have made tremendous strides toward ridding the country of
landmines and other ERW, and in clearing the
way for its country to develop and prosper. This
progress has been achieved through increased
focus and priority-based strategies, more funds
to expand the workforce and support from the
Afghan and international community. Many
challenges lie ahead if the Afghan government’s vision is to be achieved. That vision will
require even greater commitment and focus
than exhibited thus far.
			
see endnotes page 81

Adapting to Change

Afghanistan faces particular challenges: the
ongoing conflict in many parts of the country and the security threats presented by the
widespread use of improvised explosive devices by Opposition Forces. In some communities, IEDs have been laid around villages
in strategic patterns resembling traditional
minefields, although without the density of
the minefields laid by, for example, the Soviet
Forces in the 1980s.
MAPA is dealing with the IED issue carefully to ensure it maintains its humanitarian neutrality and does not deal with IEDs in
active conflict areas, which would lead to the
deminers being perceived as parties to the conflict. However, it is important to heed the humanitarian imperative of clearing fields of
abandoned IEDs in areas where conflict has
been concluded.
As the nature of Afghanistan’s armed conflict has changed over the last 20 years, MAPA
has adapted and adjusted the delivery of mineaction services. In the last few years, community-based demining has been reintroduced
to the program. Community-based demining
projects are designed by the traditional Afghan
implementing partners working closely with
community shuras (or leadership committees)
and the National Solidarity Programme Community Development Councils. These implementing partners work to develop projects that
clear mines from the community by training
local people from within that community. The
traditional implementing partners also provide expert oversight and quality management.

In the same way that buried bombs from
World War II are still discovered in Europe,
the issue posed by ERW will be a problem in
Afghanistan for many years to come. However,
these concerns should be managed in a very different way, within the realm of a small national
mine-action capacity by potentially partnering
with the Afghan National Army and police.

A demining team walks toward a minefield.
The Road Ahead

Looking to the future, the program’s major challenge is the requirement to make significant progress toward completely removing the impact of
mines and ERW. There are a number of aspects to
consider in order to achieve this objective: continued careful and strategic planning, investigation
into new technologies (for example, those needed to
clear very large minefields), continued adaptation of
the program’s structure, and a significant influx of
donor funds.
Risks Remaining

MACCA believes no risk level is acceptable in
areas communities regularly use. If the community
fears certain areas, this will have a negative impact
on its livelihood and ability to develop. Therefore,
the fear must also be addressed. One of MACCA’s
2010 tasks is to attempt to create a list of hazards
that do not cause problems for communities and
therefore could be managed in a different way.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
Demining 15 Years Later
This article outlines the demining steps taken by the United Nations and national authorities following the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. The author further
explores the shortcomings and successes of the demining projects and laws, with attention to preparations for the state’s next decade of mine action.
by Zoran Grujić [ Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Information System ]

A deminer begins activities in a new lane.

bility for mine-action coordination in July 1998.
The following three “chapters” detail the U.N.-, international community- and state-led projects in
BiH demining.
Chapter One: U.N.-led Project
A deminer in action.

I

all photos couresy of BHMAC

n 1995, the Dayton Agreement put an end
to three-and-a-half years of war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH) following the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The first minefields in
BiH were placed in late 1991 across the border with Croatia in the north. At that time,
the United Nations Protection Force1 was deploying in the country. Later, with a U.N.-instituted no-fly zone, 2 the Implementation Force3
helped significantly reduce pollution from aircraft submunitions.
According to the Dayton Agreement (Annex 1-a), former warring factions were obliged
to submit war documentation to the Implementation Force under the code name Operation Joint Endeavour. Initial information
reported 16,500 minefields and enabled IFOR
to begin clearance.
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As it was too complicated, logistically and
politically, to involve the existing three armies—
ABiH (Bosniac), HVO (Bosnian Croat Army)
and VRS (Bosnian Serb Army)—in demining,
the Dayton Agreement tasked local armies to
remove all of the minefields within their area
of responsibility, but results failed to assure that
the land could be used safely afterward.
Getting into the Game

Following the conflict’s end, BiH had no resources to begin the arduous task of clearance.
In January 1996, the Council of Ministers of BiH
requested the assistance of the United Nations
to start demining activities. As a result, during
the same year, the United Nations Mine Action
Centre was founded. The BiH demining project
started in 1996 with the center taking responsi-

The United Nations Mine Action Center was
established in Sarajevo in May 1996. RONCO, an
American contracting company, was awarded a
bid to equip, staff, train and start demining activities. Its first task was to assess the problem.
Some 16,600 minefield records were entered
into a database. At that time, mine-action centers
in Cambodia and Afghanistan had database systems, but they were custom-tailored to suit their
own needs. BiH’s situation was different: a small
area dense with contamination.
In the early days, the BiH demining effort
was a U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations program, and all activities were targeted toward establishing a mine-action-center structure.
Nevertheless, the need for action was pressing as
the landmine incident rate reached nearly 50 per
month. Reporting procedures were still in their
development phase, and demining reports from
this time had to be resurveyed.

Another part of the initial demining efforts was instituting mine awareness. Risk education started as a joint venture between the
International Committee of the Red Cross,
UNMAC and UNICEF.
The initial programs’ results were significant. The rate of more than 50 mine accidents
per month in 1995 was reduced to fewer than
30 in 1998. BiH’s problem was that all of the
available procedures at the time had been developed for sandy areas such as Afghanistan
and the Persian Gulf. In response to its unique
situation, BiH modified procedures, shifting
from a “retrace your footsteps” to a seven-step
procedure, with the primary aim to avoid entering a dangerous zone. This procedure was
later used worldwide.
Close to the end of the U.N. demining period (August 1996–July 1998) in BiH, UNMAC
had five regional offices in Tuzla, Banja Luka,
Mostar, Pale and Bihac, and was employing
close to 40 trained, local mine-action center
staff to conduct mine-action activities on their
own. UNMAC also had four fully equipped
teams capable of demining approximately six
square kilometers (2.3 square miles) per year.
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on planning and coordination among the members of the Mine Awareness Working Group.
As time passed, it became increasingly obvious that the tripartite structure could not achieve
the maximum efficiency. In February 2002, the
state parliament adopted the first demining law,
moving BiH demining to chapter three.
Chapter Three: State-led Project

A deminer uses a metal detector in preparation for Technical Survey.

Information systems successfully followed
activities, and maps were produced accurately
depicting minefields. The program was slowly
moving toward chapter two.
Chapter Two: State/International
Community-led Project

On 31 July 1998, UNMAC was transferred
to BiH authorities. To achieve this, structural changes had to be made. Project financing
for demining operations was conducted mostly through the International Trust Fund for
Demining and Mine Victim Assistance and
the United Nations Development Programme.
The staff was increased to 63 local staff members and approximately 20 international advisors and consultants.
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The tripartite structure required strong coordination, which was lacking because resources were not sufficient to support all demining
activities. With a changed mandate, it was illogical for the MAC to maintain its own demining
team, so these teams were reassigned to survey
and quality-control tasks. A number of the deminers, wishing to remain active with clearance, joined one of the three nongovernmental
organizations that were established during this
time—Pale’s Stop Mines, Sarajevo’s BH Demining and Mostar’s Pro Vita. Further, to improve
better territorial coverage, the regional offices
in Sarajevo and Travnik opened.
Information systems were refined and mapping standards were established, increasing the
MAC’s effectiveness. An emphasis was placed

BiH took responsibility for enacting the
demining law and appointed the Ministry
of Civil Affairs and the Demining Commission to be the national authority responsible
for instituting the law. BHMAC's role was to
coordinate and plan BiH mine-action activities, including establishing a mine-detection
dog center and conducting systematic landmine impact surveys. With the new demining
law, the former tripartite structure unified and
former entity offices became operational offices within their territories. While UNDP originally covered BHMAC’s operational costs, BiH
eventually assumed responsibility for the costs,
and donor countries continued to send funds
through ITF.
BHMAC decided to use Technical Survey
to release demined areas rather than focusing
solely on the complete clearance of demined
areas; this resulted in an increase in productivity. Rather than clearing 10 square kilometers (3.9 square miles) per year, figures went
up to 150 square kilometers (57.9 square miles)
cleared in 2009. Also, with the exception of
2008, there has been a decrease in landmine
accidents. Estimated annual productivity has
grown to 35–40 square kilometers (13.5–15.4
square miles) for area clearance and Technical
Survey and 80 square kilometers (30.9 square
miles) for General Survey area.

drafted a new strategic document for 2009–19.
With the new strategy, at the 9th Meeting of the
States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty, BiH submitted an application for an extension to clear
landmines; the extension was approved.
With the adoption of the first demining law,
BiH accepted responsibility for mine action
and developed standard operating procedures
and quality assurance procedures for mine-risk
education. These actions enabled strict quality control and allowed MRE field work to be
evaluated. The law’s creation also resulted in an
increase in mine-safe areas and a continual reduction (with the exception of 2008) in landmine incidents.
			
see endnotes page 81
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The Way Forward

BHMAC has begun to revise the current
demining law and create new legal documents
that would enable greater involvement of local
authorities in mine action. Having recognized
the need to plan the next decade of mine action,
the Council of Ministers evaluated the mineaction strategies employed from 2005–09 and
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Mine Action in North Sudan
North Sudan’s National Mine Action Centre is making great strides toward clearing all
known mined areas in Sudan’s northern regions by April 2014. In this article, the author, a
Quality Assurance Officer for NMAC, explores NMAC’s work, future plans and how it has
linked mine action to development and recovery in North Sudan.
by Khalid Ibrahim Hamed [ National Mine Action Centre ]

M

ore than 20 years of conflict between North and South Sudan, ending with the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement,1 has left Sudan riddled with landmines and explosive remnants of war. Based on
the CPA, the northern region of Sudan consists
of 15 states including the Blue Nile, Gadaref,
Gezira, Kassala, Khartoum, Northern, North
Darfur, North Kordofan, Red Sea, River Nile,
Sennar, South Darfur, South Kordofan, West
Darfur and the White Nile. Nine of these states
in North Sudan reportedly have varying degrees of landmine and ERW-contamination
with the Blue Nile, Kassala and Southern Kordofan being the most-affected regions.2 Despite
several years of intensive mine-action operations, landmines and ERW continue to threaten civilians and impede economic recovery
and development. Contaminated land reduces
productivity, thereby negatively affecting the
sustainable livelihoods of rural communities.
Furthermore, landmine and ERW contamination on key logistical supply routes continues
to hamper safe and free movement of citizens,
trade and humanitarian interventions. It also
endangers the lives of local communities, internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as
the staff of humanitarian operations. The presence and perceived threat of landmines/ERW
prevents and delays IDPs and refugee populations from returning to their hometowns, and
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as a result, constrains recovery, reconstruction
and development efforts in mine/ERW and waraffected areas.
The National Mine Action Centre

The National Mine Action Centre is the government body mandated to plan, coordinate and oversee all mine-action operations in coordination and
collaboration with the Northern Region Office of
the United Nations Mine Action Office in North
Sudan. NMAC also serves as an implementing arm
of the National Mine Action Authority.
As of June 2010, of the total 1,559 recorded dangerous areas identified in Sudan's nine affected
northern states, 1,164 were cleared or verified while
395 dangerous areas remain to be addressed. During clearance/verification operations, a total of 2,625
anti-personnel mines, 686 anti-tank mines, 347,472
small-arms ammunition and 35,736 items of unexploded ordnance were identified and destroyed.
As a State Party to the Ottawa Convention,
Sudan’s northern regions are meeting their envisioned end state for mine action, as well as their
obligation to clear all known mined areas by April
2014. Mine-action operations commenced in North
Sudan in 2004, and since then, North Sudan has met
a number of key milestones in reaching its minefree end state, including the establishment of the
mine-action authority and its substructures, adoption of the North Sudan mine-action law, inclusion
of mine action in the state budget and the train-

A victim-assistance project under NMAC VA supervision.
All photos courtesy of NMAC media department

ing of more than 40 mine-action management staff.
Furthermore, North Sudan has developed and resourced national landmine/ERW clearance assets,
including 120 deminers and technical staff. They
are part of the Joint Integrated Demining Units
that are actively engaged in mine/ERW clearance
activities in partnership with several international mine-action operators in North Sudan, and that
also manages a number of projects independently.
Although North Sudan continues to receive assistance from the United Nations and other donors,
mine action has also been included in the state
budget. Approximately US$13.5 million has been
allocated to mine action since mid-2006. This has
encouraged other donors to continue supporting
North Sudan to address its landmine/ERW contamination problem.
With the capacity-development assistance provided by the United Nations Development Pro-

gramme and United Nations Mine Action
Service, the national mine-action authorities
are actively engaged in the planning, coordination, priority setting, accreditation, quality
assurance and oversight of mine-action operations in North Sudan.
Development and Recovery

North Sudan has been very successful in
linking mine action to recovery and development activities. The Government of National
Unity has secured funds from the state budget,
the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the World
Bank for the rehabilitation and reconstruction
of 446 kilometers (277 miles) of railway lines,
and approximately 200 kilometers (124 miles)
of main roads have been cleared and verified to
be free of landmines and ERW in the country’s
central and southern regions.
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The Sudan Joint Integrated Demining Units go to a
field at Babanusa-Waw for a railway clearance project.

Socioeconomic rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine and ERW victims remains
a high national priority. Furthermore, North
Sudan has signed and ratified the Convention
on the Rights of People with Disabilities. Since
2007, 22 community-based projects have been
implemented for the socioeconomic rehabilitation and reintegration of the landmine and
ERW victims in various parts of the country
with generous contributions from Canada,
Japan and the state budget.
The North Sudanese authorities, UNDP and
the UNMAO have embarked on a broader and
more practical partnership in various areas of
mine action in support of the implementation
of the mine-action transition plan, and look
forward to further expanding this cooperation
and partnership in the future.

made significant progress toward transitioning
by strengthening and consolidating their institutional and management capacities. As part of
its long-term planning process, North Sudan’s
National Mine Action Authority, together with
the UNMAO, UNDP and other stakeholders,
has developed a three-year operations plan, covering 2009–11 to implement the Cartagena Action Plan. North Sudan aims to clear 80 percent
of all known high- and medium-priority affected areas by the end of 2011 at an estimated cost
of US$120 million.
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Following more than two decades of civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan,
much of Southern Sudan has been left contaminated with landmines and explosive
remnants of war. As a result, the Southern Sudan Demining Authority, along with the
United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Mine Action Office and other organizations, have been diligently working toward clearing 80 percent of the mines
in Southern Sudan by 2011.
by Margaret Matthew Mathiang [ Southern Sudan Demining Authority ]

Conclusion

North Sudan is committed to fully implementing the Cartagena Action Plan. As it reaches the Article 5 mine-clearance deadline, North
Sudan will put all necessary measures in place
to achieve all the goals and objectives set forth
in the action plan. To fulfill its Article 5 obligations, North Sudan’s national demining teams,
which are the nation’s most cost-effective and
sustainable assets, need continued and generous support from the donor community. This
will enable North Sudan to realize the goal of
being mine-free by 2014.
			
see endnotes page 81

Future of Mine Action in North Sudan

From August 2010 until April 2014, the
key challenge for North Sudan will be to clear
known-mined or suspected-mined areas under its Article 5 obligations. In the future,
North Sudan envisions producing an experienced mine-clearance staff capable of fulfilling its local role of mine clearance while
offering support to other countries through
sharing experiences and lessons and deploying trained staff.
With the engagement of all relevant stakeholders, a mine-action transition plan was concluded in November 2008. In 2009, based on the
provisions of this plan, the national authorities

Mine-action Program in
Southern Sudan

Khalid Ibrahim Hamed has been involved in mine action since 2007. As Quality Assurance Officer for the
National Mine Action Centre, he oversees the accreditation of mine-action organizations, conducts quality assurance within the mine-action operations of United
Nations Mine Action Office and reports on these operations to North Sudan’s government. In addition to his work
in humanitarian mine action, he also serves as a Major
in the Sudanese Army Engineering Corps in Khartoum,
where he has been an instructor for almost two years.
Khalid Ibrahim Hamed
Quality Assurance Officer
National Mine Action Center (NMAC)
Building 42
Block 13
Mekka Street
El-Riyadh / Sudan
Tel: +249 912849 833

T

he 21-year north-south civil war in Sudan that killed an estimated two million people, uprooted four million and
caused 600,000 to take refuge outside of Sudan1
has left Southern Sudan littered with landmines
and explosive remnants of war. The contamination poses a serious challenge to the Government of Southern Sudan’s development plans
and is considered a serious threat to the successful implementation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement signed in 2005 and ending
in 2011. In 2011, in accordance with the CPA,
a referendum will determine whether Southern Sudan will remain a part of a united Sudan
or become its own separate entity. Based on the
CPA, in 2005, Southern Sudan gained the right
to self-determination in Bahr El Gazel, Eastern
Equatoria, Jonglei, the Lakes, Northern Bahr
El-Ghazal, Warab, Western Bahr El Ghazal,
Western Equatoria, Unity and Upper Nile.
All of its 10 states are reported to have varying degrees of landmine/ERW contamination.
As with the rest of the country, the civil war
has left Southern Sudan with a large-scale landmine/ERW contamination problem. Despite
several years of intensive mine-action operations, landmine/ERW contamination continues to threaten civilians and impede economic
recovery and development. Contaminated land
reduces productivity and thereby the sustainable livelihoods of affected communities.
Landmine/ERW contamination on key logistical supply routes continues to hamper safe

and free movement, trade and provision of
humanitarian assistance. Contamination also
endangers the lives of local communities, internally displaced persons, refugees, staff of humanitarian missions and the personnel of the
United Nations Mission in Sudan. The presence
and perceived threat of landmines/ERW prevents and delays IDPs and refugee populations
from returning to their hometowns, and as a
result, constrains recovery, reconstruction and
development efforts in mine/ERW- and waraffected areas.
Mine-action Assistance

The Southern Sudan Demining Authority
is the mandated government body established
in 2006 through presidential decree number
45/20062 to plan, coordinate and oversee all
mine-action operations in Southern Sudan with
assistance from and in coordination and collaboration with the National Mine Action Centre
based in Khartoum and the southern regional
sub-office of the United Nations Mine Action
Office in Sudan.
Other partners in UNMIS who assisted
SSDA include the United Nations Development Programme in the area of capacity building, UNICEF in support of mine-risk education
initiatives, international nongovernmental organizations (Norwegian People’s Aid, Mines
Advisory Group, Danish Demining Group) and
national organizations (Operations Save Innocent Lives, Sudan Landmine Response, Sudan
Integrated Mine Action Service), as well as oth-
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United Nations and others, 5 million Sudanese
pounds (US$2.11 million)3 has been allocated by the
GOSS to mine action since mid-2006. This has encouraged other donors to continue to support mineaction operators in Southern Sudan to address its
landmine/ERW contamination.
Mine Action and Development

A mine was found along a well-traveled path.
All photos courtesy of the author.

er national and government institutions.
Achievements

Since 2004, when mine-action operations
started in Sudan, Southern Sudan has met a
number of milestones, including the establishment of the SSDA and its substructures,
drafting of the mine-action bill, inclusion of
mine action in the state budget and the training of more than 80 management staff in different technical and specified fields. Additionally,
five senior personnel from SSDA completed the
James Madison University Senior Managers'
Course in Mine Action, thereby contributing
to improved managerial performance. Furthermore, Southern Sudan is supporting the Joint
Integrated Demining Units (national landmine/ERW clearance support) and has provided 120 deminers and technical staff to the JIDU.
As of June 2010, 4,206 of the 4,733 recorded
dangerous areas identified in Southern Sudan
have been cleared or verified as mine-safe, while
another 527 dangerous areas are waiting to be
addressed. During clearance/verification operations, a total of 17,023 anti-personnel mines,
2,290 mines, 779 landmines of unknown origin,
836,355 small arms ammunition and 575,382
pieces of unexploded ordnance have been found
and destroyed.2
With the capacity development assistance
provided by UNDP and the UNMAO, the SSDA
is now actively engaged in the planning, coordination, priority setting, accreditation, quality
assurance and oversight of mine-action operations. In addition to assistance provided by the
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Sudan has been very successful in linking mine
action to recovery and development activities.
Northern Sudan’s Government of National Unity and the GOSS have secured funds from the state
budget, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the World
Bank for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of
446 kilometers (277 miles) of railway lines and approximately 200 kilometers (124 miles) of main
roads have been cleared of landmines/ERW in the
central and southern parts of Sudan. The clearance
of railway lines has been extremely important in restoring safe passage between Northern and Southern Sudan as the Babanusa-Wau railway line is the
only all-season land link between the northern and
southern parts of the country. In addition, the clearance and reconstruction of railway lines and roads
has enabled the safe return and resettlement of IDPs
and refugees.
Socioeconomic rehabilitation and reintegration
of the victims of landmines/ERW continues to be a
priority on the national agenda. Sudan has signed
and ratified the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities. Over the past three years, 22
community-based projects have been implemented
for the socioeconomic rehabilitation and reintegration of the victims of landmines and ERW in various
parts of the country with generous contributions
from Canada, Japan and the state budget.
Challenges

Southern Sudan is working toward becoming
“impact free” as soon as possible, as achieving the
status of “landmine free” is very much debatable.
One of the key challenges for Southern Sudan is the
clearance of known mined/suspected mined areas to
provide a safe environment for returning IDPs and
refugees. In addition, the SSDA in Southern Sudan
faces challenges from the long rainy seasons, logistical complications and lack of enough data to determine the level, type and locations of contamination.

As UNMAO is operating under UNMIS’s mandate, a reduction in international support is also expected during the forthcoming referendum period.
This loss of funding calls for more financial support
to national mine-action capacities, which remains a
challenge for the GOSS, as it must confront conflicting development priorities in the post-war rehabilitation period.

A man walks past unexploded ordnance.
Transition Plan and End State

Southern Sudan faces major challenges in pursuit
of clearing all known landmines by 2014; however,
this might not be realistic due to the aforementioned
geographical and logistical challenges.
With the engagement of all relevant stakeholders,
a mine-action transition plan was concluded in November 2008. Based on the provisions of the transition plan, the national authorities made significant
progress in 2009 by strengthening and consolidating their institutional and management capacities.
The aim of the process is to transition the management and coordination of the Sudan Mine Action
Programme to national authorities in a systematic
and gradual manner as soon as possible but no later than early 2011. The desired end state therefore
is that the national authorities in Sudan manage all
aspects of mine action with minimal technical assistance from the United Nations. The national authorities, UNDP and UNMAO have embarked on
a broader and more practical partnership in mine
action to support the implementation of the mineaction transition plan and would like to further expand this cooperation and partnership in the years
to come.

As part of SSDA’s long-term planning process and in its implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan, UNMAO, UNDP and all other
stakeholders have developed a three-year operations plan covering 2009–11. With the implementation of the plan, Sudan aims to clear 80
percent of all known high- and medium-priority
affected areas by the end of 2011 at an estimated
cost of US$120 million.
Southern Sudan Demining Authority has
developed a three-year strategic plan that aims
to strengthen national capacities in mine-action activities and to meet the vision of freeing
the country from the effects and threat of landmines and ERW. Southern Sudan also envisions
itself to one day be active regionally and globally supporting other countries with an exchange of lessons learned and deployment of
trained and experienced staff. In the meantime, Southern Sudan continues to address its
landmine/ERW contamination. It is in need
of ongoing generous support from the donor community to all mine-action operators
working in the region.
			
see endnotes page 81
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NOTES FROM THE FIELD

Falkland Islands Demining Pilot
Project: Completion of Phase 1
The United Kingdom has started to remove anti-personnel mines from the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands1 in order to meet its obligations under Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention. A pilot phase
was completed in June 2010 to clear four suspected hazardous areas—a critical first step to
inform future projects following the conclusion of the Joint U.K.-Argentine Feasibility Study.
by Robin Swanson [ Biron Associates Ltd. ]

A

n article in the 14.1 issue of The Journal of ERW
and Mine Action made some observations
about the completion status of the Falkland
Islands Demining Program. 2 This article aims to articulate the program’s objectives, the problems encountered and methodologies used, and to draw on some of
the key lessons learned from the experience.

tic, minimum-metal mines, which present a challenge
for conventional metal-detection technologies due to
the exceptionally small quantities of metal within the
mines. Some of the SHAs had been subjected to BL 755
cluster-munitions strikes, but because of their high
metallic content, these did not present the same level of
technical challenge to detect.

Objectives

Clearance Methodologies Used

The program’s objectives were twofold: to conduct a
pilot clearance program to meet the requirements of Article 5 obligations and to inform future projects about
clearance challenges. For this reason, the U.K. government selected four suspected hazardous areas in close
consultation with the Falkland Islands government,
which would provide different types of terrain and different mine and unexploded-ordnance threats—two
SHAs near Stanley were known minefields (Surf Bay and
Sapper Hill), and accurate minefield documents were
held for them, while the ones in Goose Green and Fox
Bay East had a less well-defined threat. The U.K. government set standards in excess of International Mine
Action Standards by demanding a 200-millimeter (7.87
inches) contract depth for the clearance of mine panels. In addition, mines affected by the formation of sand
dunes required excavation 300 millimeters (11.81 inches) below the 1982 profile. These increased standards
were designed to address concerns within the island
community about the ability of a mine-clearance program to remove all of the explosive hazards.

Modern metal-detection equipment struggled to detect the minimum-metal mines to the contract depth.
Therefore, the demining contractor BACTEC International Ltd. used layered and full excavation techniques,
depending on the expected mine threat, to meet the
contract’s requirements. The mines had been laid in a
very formal pattern using cord and markers at intervals, and the documents recording the two minefields
near Stanley soon proved to be credible records of the
mine pattern.4 Therefore, once rows were encountered,
the mine patterns could be followed and fully exploited using excavation techniques. This is a slow and demanding method of clearance in normal circumstances,
but additional external factors exacerbated the situation
further. During austral summer 2009–10, the Island recorded the worst weather patterns on record, with conditions including cold high winds, rain, sleet and snow.
Additionally, much of the contaminated ground consisted of thick, fibrous peat and heavy vegetation, which
was difficult to cut. This challenged the deminers5 to
draw on exceptional levels of patience, skill, good humor, and sheer grit and determination.
The Surf Bay Minefield was the most challenging
task. The dense, mixed minefield contained more than
1,000 mines (SB33 & SB81) within a relatively small area
of 3.34 hectares (8.25 acres), and the terrain also varied

The Threat

The Joint U.K.-Argentine Feasibility Study3 identified the different types of landmines encountered on
the islands. The majority of minefields contain plas-
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been excavated and where the mines
were located, was absolutely essential to ensure efficient use of time
and resources. Fortunately, the Public Works Department on the Islands
had access to Real Time Kinematic
Survey7 and its survey team supported the minefield mapping process
very effectively.
Where the threat was less welldefined at Goose Green and Fox Bay,
traditional non-technical and technical survey procedures were adopted. Much information still exists
within the Falkland Islands local
and military community and among
military veterans concerning the
events that took place during and
immediately after the 1982 conflict.
Fortunately for this pilot project,
quality information was available.
This may not be the case for many
other areas where the minefield documents and records do not exist,
and as time goes on, memories will
fade, and key witnesses will be harder to track and interview.
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The Environment

Fully excavating the access lanes on Sapper Hill before the first P4Bs were encountered.
Photo courtesy of Guy Marot, DPO Technical Adviser

within it. The local airport road bisected the minefield with deep peat
to the west and gradually thinner
peat and sandier terrain toward the
beach on the east. Six mixed mine
panels6 straddled a previous track in
sandy soil in the minefield’s northeast part where sand accumulation demanded manual excavation
of 400 millimeters (15.74 inches).
Two further panels, consisting of 16
anti-vehicle mines each, had been
covered by large sand dunes since
1982. Conflict-aerial photography
revealed that the mines had been

laid at the current beach level, which
was marked by a cobbled layer of
stone, but the sand dunes were between two and five meters (7–16 feet)
above that level. After initially identifying the start of the first panel using manual excavation techniques, it
then became a mechanical clearance
task routinely operating in four to
five meters (13–16 feet) of sand.
Finding mines at these depths required systematic search procedures.
One early lesson learned was that a
detailed, centimeter-accurate survey,
used to establish exactly what had

Concerns about the project’s environmental impact were raised before it began and were a particular
issue for the Falkland Islands government. The Planning Permission
and consent provided by the FI government required submission of an
acceptable ground remediation plan
with each SHA Clearance Plan and
that steps were taken to educate the
deminers in the identification of
rare plant species expected in the
area. The Clearance Plans divided
the cleared areas into three parts:
1. One area is left to recover naturally.
2. One area has the cut vegetation
replaced so seeds from the cuttings can drop and germinate.
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Armored excavator searching for the SB81 mines at the 1982 profile within the Surf Bay Sand Dunes.

The sand was replaced in a manner to provide relief for natural forces to operate.

Photo courtesy of the author

Photo courtesy of Josephine Swanson

3.

One area is left for a different
approach to be specified using
natural and introduced methods. A broad plan was developed to satisfy these planning
conditions.
Perfectly rebuilding the sand
dunes was never an aspiration, but
in close cooperation with the Environmental Planning Department,
BACTEC replaced the sand to the
best of their abilities, stabilizing the
dunes’ bases where possible using
geo-textiles and aggregate bags. The
area was left deliberately unsmooth
in order to provide relief for natural
forces to work on and to catch drifting seeds for germination purposes.
Monitoring will take place over
the next two years to establish the
most effective approach for future
programs; not only does it need to
be environmentally acceptable, it
needs to be a practical, relatively
simple and cost-effective procedure.
These additional planning require-
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ments are not always associated with
mine-action programs and provided
different challenges which required
close liaison with local environmental bodies.
Although the tender document
had been written to discourage the
use of specialist mechanical systems, at the end of the process, the
final result was visually not dissimilar to what might have resulted from
a mechanical approach without the
advantages of immediate re-germination when earth is processed and
seeds are reintroduced immediate-

ly. As a result of the pilot program,
these alternative approaches may be
considered during follow-up phases.
Results

The following table represents the
areas actually cleared (including additional battle-area clearance tasks
associated with the four SHAs) and
records the mines and UXO located between 3 December 2009 and 4
June 2010:
In order to place this into context, it is useful to note that Argentina10 declared to the United Nations

SHA

AP Mines

AV Mines

Surf Bay SA-008

488 SB33

568 SB81

-

-

Surf Bay BAC
(Canache Wet Area)
Sapper Hil SA-025
Sapper Hill BAC8
(BL755 Strike Area)
Goose Green GG-011
Fox Bay FB-008W
Fox Bay BAC (Headland Area)
Total

190 P4B

-

UXO
1 M67 Grenade +
7.62mm ammo
4 M67 Grenades
+ 7.62 ammo
-

-

-

-

6.29 Ha

-

-

-

2.41 Ha
2.3 Ha

-

-

-

1.99 Ha9

678

568

8 UXO + 7.62mm
ammo

20.54 Ha

Summary of areas cleared.
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Area Cleared
3.34 Ha
3.44 Ha
0.77 Ha

that it brought 25,000 landmines to the Falkland Islands at the start of the conflict (20,000 anti-personnel
and 5,000 anti-vehicle mines) and that some 5,000 have
been accounted for since the conflict ended. This means
that approximately 20,000 landmines remained in the
ground prior to Phase 1 clearance and that this program cleared more than 6 percent of the remaining
mine contamination.
Confidence Building

An important part of any demining program is instilling confidence within the local community. On
arrival, the Demining Programme Office11 needed to
reassure the community that all the mines could be removed from the areas selected, and to address a widely-held community view that the money could be better
spent removing mines in other parts of the world. While
this may be an honorable stance, the United Kingdom
has an international obligation to clear the landmines in
the Falkland Islands; therefore, the money for the Phase 1
program was allocated separately from the donations the
United Kingdom provided for other international mineaction projects.
The Falkland Islands government was also concerned
about the risk of injury to deminers when local demand
to clear the minefields was nonexistent, no civilian injuries were sustained, and the minefields posed no human-

itarian, social or economic impact to the community.
Fortunately, no one sustained injuries during the program, which can be attributed to good procedures, correct protective equipment and a strong ethos for safety
adopted by BACTEC and the DPO.
The FI government and the local community were
also influenced by certain historical myths that had perpetuated over time, adding to the belief that full clearance was impossible. One of these myths was that mines
move in peat and would not be found. Most surface layers of peat (0–300 millimeters, or 0–11.81 inches) contain
fibrous peat, or at least semi-fibrous peat, in the topsoil’s
lower parts, with a structure displaying horizontal laminations reflecting the gradual accumulation of little-decomposed plant debris. The large surface area and light
weight of the mine would make it highly unlikely to shift
within the peat and, indeed, the Phase 1 clearance program found no evidence of this. Taking Sapper Hill as
an example of a typical peat minefield, no P4B mine was
found deeper than 120 millimeters (4.72 inches), and 97
percent were at less than 80 millimeters (3.14 inches) or
were located on the surface. The program did conclude,
not surprisingly, that light, plastic anti-personnel mines
can be moved by wind, water or by ground slippage,
particularly when the topography, such as downhill
gradients, was also a factor. Most mines were discovered at their predicted location within the documented
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By the end of the program, all mine signs
were removed from the cleared sites, but the
fences remained around the former minefields
at Surf Bay and Sapper Hill. The fences remained in place not to mark the areas as unsafe,
but to prevent unnecessary damage during the
environmental remediation period and to allow
proper monitoring of the regeneration process.
Conclusion

Surface-laid P4B with lot numbers easily visible and rubber seals
intact.
Photo courtesy of Guy Marot

One key conclusion from this program indicates that further research and development
is necessary to improve the ability of manually detecting minimum-metal mines at greater
depths. The program encountered many physical and philosophical challenges; however, it
was an enormous success. This pilot phase will
undoubtedly inform future projects about the
technical, environmental and logistical challenges associated with clearance in the Falkland Islands, and will provide more accurate
planning data for follow-on phases.
			
see endnotes page

The manually excavated area at Sapper Hill. (Yellow pickets indicate where P4B mines were found.)
Photo courtesy of the author

pattern, but natural forces had moved a very small minority. What is particularly interesting is that the condition of the majority of the mines was very good despite
resting in acidic soil and damp conditions for 28 years,
and we assess that most would certainly have functioned
given the right pressure.
The FI government, concerned about its residual liability in the event of any future incident within the
cleared areas, considered a number of proposals to keep
the fences and some form of warning signs in place after clearance. The DPO made many announcements
through the media to keep the community fully informed of the clearance process, encouraged visits to the
minefields and held briefings to explain the detail and
quality procedures associated with the clearance program. In addition, a public confidence demonstration
was run after the completion of each task site. Following
the last demonstration at Surf Bay, spectators swarmed
onto the cleared area with their children confirming
their confidence in the clearance process.
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Strengthening the Demining 		
Sector Response to HIV/AIDS
		 in Sub-Saharan Africa
In this article, the author explores how HIV/AIDS affects deminers in the African areas
where the disease is most prevalent. He considers how deminers’ lifestyles make them
especially susceptible to HIV/AIDS and suggests mobile HIV/AIDS programs can effectively combat this growing threat.
by Dr. Martin Chitsama [ Demining HIV/AIDS Service Foundation ]

D

emining began in SubSaharan Africa in the
early 1990s, incidentally commencing just a decade after
the HIV/AIDS pandemic started
calling on the human race.1 According to the 2007 and 2009 Landmine Monitor Report and national
mine-action centers in Africa, at
least 50 national and international
demining organizations currently
conduct landmine-clearance operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, collectively employing more than 10,000
deminers.2 Angola's National Demining Institute alone has a contingent of 4,000 deminers organized
into 18 brigades that are demining
across the heavily mined southern
African country.2
Considering that all the African
States Parties to the Ottawa Convention are lagging behind their targets
under Article 5 and are continually
calling for extensions, deminers in
Africa are set to clear landmines on
the continent for many more years.
As reported in 2009 by the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/
AIDS (UNAIDS), the region is also
"more heavily affected by HIV and
AIDS than any other region of the

Demining crews always have medical teams onsite. Medics
could be trained to run workplace HIV/AIDS advocacy programs.
All photos courtesy of Joseph Kilino, MDD Handler, VDS Angola

world.” All in all, “an estimated 22.4
million people are living with HIV
in the region—around two thirds of
the global total.”3 As a result, large
numbers of deminers in Africa are
at a significant risk of contracting
HIV/AIDS for many reasons, including worker mobility and extended separation from spouses.
For a deminer, the work-leave cycle provides for limited family time
in a year. There is so much to catch
up on when families reunite after long separation periods that the

question of checking on a spouse's
HIV status is hardly a priority.
The demining-site remoteness
means that deminers are cut off
from mainstream public-health
campaigns, including HIV/AIDS
programs. Health workers fear traveling to suspected-mined regions in
Africa, which also leaves deminers
isolated in terms of outreach programs. Furthermore, deminers are
usually 20 to 49 years old, sexually active and tend to have capital to
spend while interacting with war-
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Demining Control Points could carry HIV/AIDS-advocacy banners, reaching out to millions of people using roads being cleared of landmines in Africa.

torn communities whose sexually active youths often
engage in commercial sex due to limited economic options.
To compound the situation, most demining operators in Sub-Saharan Africa only have informal HIV/
AIDS policies, and financial and human resource constraints hamper the transformation of these policies into
workplace programs. The inherent risk associated with
demining further puts deminers at risk of occupational
exposure to HIV transmission when a landmine casualty occurs. All personnel on the demining site are involved if an incident occurs and occupational exposure
is probable during the handling of the injured party. Additionally, antiretroviral post-exposure prophylaxis4 is
largely absent in the demining industry.
Deminers and HIV/AIDS

In May 2002, the Interagency Coalition on AIDS and
Development made observations regarding the relationship between deminers and HIV/AIDS risk and recommended that intervention programs be implemented for
the sector. The Accelerated Demining Programme in
Mozambique claims that while it has lost only one deminer to a mine accident, it has lost 10 to HIV/AIDS.5
The labor laws in some countries, such as Mozambique, demonstrate the difficulties that demining
companies face regarding HIV tests and can result in
demining operators facing legal problems. For instance,
in 2005, Mozambican Labour Minister Helena Taipo
rejected an appeal by the U.S.-based demining company RONCO Consulting Corporation against a fine imposed for violating Mozambique's ban on compulsory
HIV tests. In June 2005, the Labour Ministry discovered
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that when selecting Mozambican sappers to go on a demining mission to Afghanistan, RONCO required them
to take HIV tests. Similarly, ArmorGroup was fined in
Mozambique for allegedly hiring deminers destined for
Cyprus on the basis of HIV results. In addition, Zimbabwe’s Southern Africa Demining Services Agency had to
compensate deminers loaned to BACTEC International
for South Lebanon operations in 2002 when the deminers were denied deployment on the basis of HIV tests.
The Solution

The World Health Organization, UNAIDS and the
United Nations Population Fund recommend the implementation of mobile HIV/AIDS services targeting
hard-to-reach populations, including deminers. The
mobile-service efficacy for hard-to-reach populations
has been demonstrated by the Uganda Program for Human and Holistic Development, the success of voluntary
counseling and testing in the United States Agency for
International Development's outreach services in Ethiopia, New Start Centres in Zimbabwe, and through the
Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome’s report on increased voluntary counseling and testing
uptake in mobile clinics as compared to "stand alone"
clinics in Nairobi, Kenya. Similarly, the Tanzanian Military reports success stories for its four mobile HIV clinics established with the U. S. Military HIV Research
Program in 25 camps along Tanzania’s Lake Zone.6
Feasibility and Benefits of Mobile HIV/AIDS
Programs for Deminers

Having worked with thousands of deminers as a
medical doctor from 1998 to the present, I have inter-

acted with deminers in Luena and Menongue (Angola);
Shilalo (Eritrea); Mukumbura (Mozambique); Garowe
and Hargeisa (Somalia); Ed Damazin, Juba and Rumbek (Sudan); and the Gonarezhou National Park and the
Zambezi Basin (Zimbabwe). I recommend implementing mobile HIV/AIDS programs for deminers for the
following reasons:
• Deminers have easy access to medics at their worksites, which would allow the medics to be trained
and become part of the HIV/AIDS healthcare team.
• Demining operators will benefit from getting tested: Negative HIV deminers will want to preserve
their statuses, and positive deminers will be anxious
to enter into antiretroviral treatment programs.
• Circumcision is of particular interest, and if presented properly, this practice will benefit deminers
and their spouses significantly. Circumcision benefits are well-documented, and instituting Kenya’s
Raila Odinga-inspired male circumcision program7
to the demining setting would immensely benefit
deminers.8
• All Sub-Saharan African states have national and
regional HIV/AIDS policies, but these policies are
sometimes contradictory. Forming national/regional protocols for hiring and managing deminers is
practical.
• The United Nations International Mine Action
Standards IMAS 10.409 already provides for the
updating of HIV lists during demining operations
making it easy for the United Nations to contact deminers and provide comprehensive HIV/AIDS programs for them.
Call for Mobile HIV/AIDS Services for Deminers

Motivated by the success stories of mobile HIV/AIDS
services programs targeting hard-to-reach groups and
the feasibility of an HIV/AIDS program for deminers, a
group comprised of demining experts and medical doctors who had worked in demining for the past decade
formed an initiative called The Demining HIV/AIDS
Service Foundation in 2009. The Foundation, a nonprofit trust based in South Africa, was specifically created to
mitigate the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa’s demining sector.
The Foundation is calling the mine-action community to partner with it in building up and implementing

the following programs for deminers and landmineimpacted communities in Sub-Saharan Africa:
• An HIV/AIDS risk-assessment profile for deminers
• An HIV/AIDS educational program for deminers
and program managers
• Mobile Voluntary HIV/AIDS counseling and testing programs for deminers
• Delivery of mobile male circumcision services for
deminers in Sub-Saharan Africa
• Delivery of antiretroviral treatment and care for deminers in Sub-Saharan Africa
				
see endnotes page 82
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The Growing Threat to
Humanitarian Operations
Deminers and other humanitarian-aid workers around the world, though previously
viewed as off-limits, have become targets of distrust and even violence by certain
groups. This article explores the reasons for this shift in ideology, and what action humanitarian organizations must take in order to protect their personnel.
by Adrian King [ HMS, Ltd. ]

T

he days of showing respect to civilian humanitarian-aid personnel and organizations in the field
are long gone, so that even the once sacrosanct
International Committee of the Red Cross is no longer safe from attack. In recent times, increased rhetoric
against the United Nations and humanitarian-aid agencies, mainly from jihadist groups (such as those in the
call-out box below), has led to a long overdue appraisal
of the vulnerability of aid workers and U.N. peacekeeping personnel as the global security situation deteriorates and risk of violent attack increases.

and its allies, to suppress Islam, spread Christianity in
the Muslim world, and support an invasion and occupation strategy directed toward Muslim countries. These
views can be seen in the Afghan Talibans' monthly magazine, Al Samood.
One only has to look at the grim record of attacks
against personnel working for U.N. agencies and other humanitarian-aid organizations to appreciate the
fragile and, at times, near non-existent nature of security measures taken in the field. Humanitarian organizations and personnel must understand that deprived

“The UN is also standing with the enemy against Muslims
what about the standing Muslim matters like Palestine,
Chechnya, Cyprus ... and other Muslim matters, all these are
evidence of the oppression of the UN against Muslim countries ...”
Al Somood, The Struggle1 (jihadist propaganda)
The Developing Mindset

Since the rise in international terrorism, providing
aid has become more of a high-risk occupation than ever
before. Military operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq
have fueled the ill-informed and biased speculation of the
jihadists and stirred suspicion of Western motives in these
and other regions, with aid workers often seen as agents
of military powers. Both the United Nations and aid organizations are now viewed in some areas of the world as
being part of a Western agenda, led by the United States
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populations’ access to aid must be balanced against underlying security threats where, as a consequence, the
susceptibility and accessibility of aid personnel and
their local employees is increased, and the risk of violent compromise in certain locations is ever more likely.
Valuable Human Assets

Personnel engaged in humanitarian work are dedicated to the work they do and the people they serve.
Thoroughly commited to their vocation, these aid work-

U.S. Army soldiers assigned to the 203rd Combat Engineer Battalion of the Missouri Army National Guard use a tracked excavator to remove tons of rubble and debris as rescue workers search for victims at the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator building in Baghdad, Iraq, after a truck bomb destroyed much of the building on 19 August 2003.
Photo courtesy of Master Sergeant James M. Bowman, USAF

ers venture into areas and situations considered by most
to have an unacceptable risk of attack or at least confrontation with hostile groups. These groups, for one
reason or another, do not appreciate or support the aid
work carried out, and because of their beliefs, view humanitarian-aid workers and those who support them as
viable targets for aggression.
In the demining world, work is often conducted in
countries where the underlying security situation is unstable or where low-level conflict is in progress. However, exceptions exist. In Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia
for example, mine-action activities continue effectively despite widespread and ongoing violence, where no
peaceful resolution is in sight and the situation may escalate at any time. In the case of Afghanistan, NATO
maintains that its in-country presence is for the purposes of stabilization and infrastructure development.
Unfortunately, this gives the impression that the “war”
has been won when it is apparent that ever more violence occurs daily in communities and organizations
throughout the country.
Sanctioning the deployment of U.N.-armed military
personnel to a country or region in crisis not only shows
that violence is expected, but that weapons used for pro-

tection are essential to the success of legally mandated
work in agreement between national governance and the
United Nations. The question then has to be asked, in
view of this decision to deploy an armed force, on what
basis do nongovernmental organizations and private
and commercial companies deploy their personnel to
such areas, where the risk of attack is high and the level of protection offered is generally not commensurate
with the threats that may be encountered?
As previously alluded to, many individuals are
“called” to intercede on behalf of the victims of crisis
through their vocation and belief, but what is their level
of responsibility, both to themselves and to those who
will support them in-country and be formally engaged
by them in the conduct of their mission? And perhaps
more importantly, what is the responsibility of the organizations that employ humanitarian workers?
The posed questions are not meant to undermine
an individual’s integrity or an organization’s justification for carrying out humanitarian work, but to provoke
discussion on the criteria used to guide risk assessment.
This assessment should be conducted with the expatriate
professionals and the local nationals involved at varying
levels, from humble driver to mission manager.
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Process and Procedure

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are the legal basis for categorizing humanitarian work; they guarantee protection for humanitarian workers provided that
they are not party to the conflict. The Conventions do
not, however, give right of access to conflict areas; and
although combatant attacks on humanitarian personnel
are prohibited, providing escorts is not a requirement, including where other factions may pose a threat to safety.
This article does not provide an analysis of all attacks
on U.N. or other aid personnel, but in analyzing demining specifically, it is possible to draw a loose analogy
from the evidence gathered through attacks and, in some
2

flict and enabling infrastructure renewal and a return to
normal life activity. For the majority, mine action would
be seen as an essential and normal part of a country’s
post-conflict recovery process, and many would perhaps
struggle to understand why people would oppose such
action taking place. The reality is not so simple, however, and in assessing the chronological data of attacks on
demining personnel, one has to surmise that a political
motive is often the basis for the incident. In Afghanistan,
the Taliban see the United Nations and other aid organizations as collaborators with NATO’s International Stabilization Force and corruptors of the Muslim religion,
views echoed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

“The UN is a tool of American global politics, duping people by
claiming that it is a neutral international organization, where it is in
fact a criminal American institution; the presidential election in Kabul is evidence enough of this. This organization has not been
established to support and help people, and since it was established, it has taken part and contributed to war crimes ...
In the same way the invader forces will be forced to leave
Afghanistan; this institution called the UN must leave for good ...”
~ Al Somood. The Struggle”1 (jihadist propaganda)
cases, predict a continuance of the trend in some countries and regions. Since 2003, more than 50 mine-action
personnel have died from non-mine related injuries, the
majority in Afghanistan.3 The evidence shows that, in
most cases, attacks are targeted directly at the demining
workers and not randomly, as some believe. In the majority of the incidents, the attacks were carried out using
small arms and improvised explosive devices, the latter
of which are a well-known threat in Afghanistan and a
growing threat globally, and which allow precise targeting without exposure to retaliation or identification of
the perpetrator(s) at the incident scene.
Deminers as Targets

Mine action is an activity built on military breaching and explosive ordnance disposal skills to remove
area explosive hazards, thus allowing repatriation of
displaced persons and communities following the con-
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For these reasons, attacks on the United Nations
and humanitarian-aid workers, including demining
personnel, are justified in the perpetrators’ minds, but
aid workers’ links with sponsors and other organizations may further strengthen motives, as in the case of
the lethal attack on deminers in Kandahar province on
11 April 2010, where the Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) sponsored the
victims’ demining activity. This extra “link” (i.e., the
sponsorship) may provide an additional motive for an
attacker to target one aid group over another and should
possibly be part of the risk-assessment process.
Another possible motive for attacking deminers in
Afghanistan and elsewhere is because mine action removes resources from the Taliban’s arsenal. Their use of
explosive remnants of war as main charges in their IEDs,
or even as a viable ammunition source, is well known.

This was recognized in Iraq during
the height of the insurgency, where
foreign contractors were deliberately used to remove explosive ordnance from stockpiles and former
battle positions in an attempt to interrupt the chain of activities that led
to building IEDs to attack Coalition
troops.
Protecting Deminers

As employers, humanitarian demining organizations have a duty of
care and responsibility toward their
personnel. Top-level personnel must
thoroughly investigate the risk of attack and assess and mitigate against
apparent threats in the country and

the growing threat levels, aid organizations in general should take a
more responsible stance in providing levels of security. If it is known
that attacks are likely and that reprisals may also be visited on local
workers as a result of mine action
or any other humanitarian activity,
the decision to deploy at all should
be questioned.
The United Nations, which oversees demining and other contracts,
should perhaps also play its part by
ensuring organizations and individuals are aware of the inherent risks of
working in a particular country or
region and that they are taking the
proper security precautions. Person-

“... attacks on the United Nations and humanitarianaid workers, including demining personnel, are justified in the perpetrators’ minds, but aid workers’ links
with sponsors and other organizations may further
strengthen motives ...”
~ Al Somood. The Struggle”1 (jihadist propaganda)
region of the proposed work activity.
At the lower levels, the duty extends,
through managers and team leaders,
to enacting and maintaining the security plan and providing local operating procedures and resources in
managing the risks described.
The threshold for conducting or
suspending mine-action operations
due to security concerns is usually
a responsibility of the mine-action
coordination center, if present incountry, normally on advice from
a number of internal and external
agencies. Yet is this enough? Is it
sufficient, and is it justifiable in high
threat-level locations such as Afghanistan and Somalia? Surely with

Adrian King is a Counter-IED Expert employed by HMS Ltd., an Allen Vanguard
Group company. His diverse military career has included more than 30 years of
working in conflict and post-conflict situations, including crisis response and demining operations in Iraq and Lebanon.
King was involved in counter-IED training
for NATO in Afghanistan and is involved in
a number of tasks, including the development of accredited conventional munitions
disposal and demining training programs,
as well as a UXO-clearance task in the
Middle East.
Adrian King
Consultant
Hazard Management Solutions Ltd.
85-88 Shrivenham
Hundred Business Park
Watchfield
Swindon SN6 8TY / UK
Tel: +44 (0)1793 786350
Fax: +44 (0)1793 786351
E-mail: Adrian.king@hazmansol.com
Website: http://hms-online.org

nel validation should begin prior to
arrival in the country and should include checks to make certain that employees are sufficiently briefed and
trained on safety issues, and provided with the resources, including
procedures and equipment, to safely conduct their work. However, this
should only happen after an organization understands the risks involved
and has determined whether it is prudent to allow the commencement or
sustainment of humanitarian demining activity in a specific area.
see endnotes page 82
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In Remembrance:

Stephen “Darby” Allan

S

tephen “Darby” Allan, a Technical
Field Manager with Mines Advisory Group, died on 15 October 2010, following an explosion in which he was
critically injured. The explosion took
place around noon as Darby was doing mine-clearance work at a site near
Kapoeta, in Southern Sudan. He died
a few hours later. Darby is survived by
his wife, Karen, and his children, Sarah
and David.
A British national from Portsmouth,
Darby Allan began his mine-action career doing underwater and shoreline
mine clearance as a diver in the Royal
Navy. In 2002, he began working as an
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist
and Trainer at the Defence EOD School
on Horsea Island. A year later he was
promoted to Chief Instructor for the
Royal Navy Clearance Diving Officers,
a position he held until he joined MAG
in 2006.
Darby worked as a Technical Field
Manager for MAG for nearly four
years, moving from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to Lebanon and
finally to Sudan in September 2009.
MAG estimates that the land Darby
helped clear around Kapoeta, will benefit more than 7,000 people in the area
who are now able to grow crops, build
schools and raise telephone masts. The
town’s market, a vital source of trade
for the region, has also been built on
land cleared by MAG teams.
During a celebration of Darby’s life,
Lou McGrath, OBE, MAG’s Chief Executive, said, “He took pride in reducing the risks communities faced …. [He]

Darby Allan in a MAG vehicle with his son David during the MAG project they worked together on in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008.
photo courtesy of the Allan family

did not have to be in Sudan; he chose
to be. He was a true humanitarian who
believed in making a difference, and
the world will be a lesser place without
him.”
Darby Allan’s family, friends and
coworkers paid tribute to his life and
work as well. Lieutenant Commander Mick Beale, who knew Darby from
their time together at Horsea Island,
praised him as “a hugely experienced
diver” and “an inspiration and a true
legend in the diving branch. He was a
big man with a big heart who could always be relied on to get the job done
with no fuss,” he said. Andy Glesson,

a member of MAG’s technical staff
who worked closely with Darby in
Lebanon, called him “a great team
member with a dry humor [and] a
dependable, affable technician who
managed several clearance teams
with skill and determination.” Finally, Darby’s wife Karen said, “He
was a gritty, humorous man who
commanded friendship and respect
from colleagues and friends, a person who was not just larger than life
but was, in fact, life. We are proud
to say we were part of that life and it
was a great, great adventure. Thank
you for the adventure.”

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

Research and Development Section Sponsored by
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The Effect of Reinforcement
Rate Variations on Hits and
False Alarms in Remote Explosive
Scent Tracing with Dogs

Method
Subjects. Six male non-neutered dogs, aged between 6½ and 7½
years, with several years of previous REST training participated. Five
were Labrador Retrievers (Retzina, Stavros, Tan, Zante and Zulu) and
one was a Springer Spaniel (Rusty). Each dog was assigned an experienced Angolan dog handler. The dogs were exercised six days a week by
walking and swimming, housed in individual kennels, given free access
to water, fed a high-quality dry dog food in sufficient quantities to maintain a healthy weight, and were not food-deprived.

Detection animals offer untapped potential in terms of locating landmines and explosive ordnance in the field and
in the laboratory. In this study, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining investigated the effect
of low, medium, and high levels of reward on the performance of six dogs searching filters for explosive odor.
by Rebecca J. Sargisson [ University of Waikato ] and Ian G. McLean [ Consultant ]

R

Indicate

Ignore

Positive

Correct

Incorrect

Hit

Miss

Negative

emote Explosive Scent Tracing—or
Odor Capture—is a detection process
in which odor is captured on an absorbent filter and analyzed by a detector, such as a dog
or rat.1,2 The detector works in a safe and controlled environment and is capable of searching large areas of ground in a short period.
Odor capture has a wide range of potential applications (for example, the detection of oilpipeline leaks and the detection of cancer or
tuberculosis), but with respect to explosive
detection, REST’s main value is eliminating
road sections that do not contain explosive
ordnance, allowing clearance to proceed more
rapidly than is possible using most standard
detection technologies.

Incorrect

Correct

FA

CR

Table 1: Matrix of outcomes in a
REST task.
All graphics and photos courtesy of the authors.

REST will only be used if it can deliver
consistently-high detection reliability for filters containing explosive odor (hits on “positive” filters). However, as a key use of REST
is for uncontaminated land release, REST
must also deliver reliable decisions on filters
not containing explosive odor (correct rejection of “negative” filters). A filter analysis produces four possible outcomes (See Table 1), of

64

which two are undesirable—“miss” and “false
alarm.” A miss means that explosive ordnance
is undetected, presenting a danger to future
land users. A false alarm means unnecessary additional work for the mine-clearance
program. Low reliability on either of these
outcomes reduces confidence in REST as a detection technology.
The typical procedure is summarized as
follows. A team uses a suction pump to vacuum the air over a road section, typically 100 or
200 meters (109 or 218 yards) long and about
5 meters (5 yards) wide. The air is sucked
through a filter, and careful records are kept of
the road section that each filter represents. The
filters are transferred to a laboratory where
they are presented to trained detectors (usually dogs or rats) using a standard methodology,
such as on the arms of a carousel (Figure 1) or
in a line of stands (Figure 2).
The dogs are trained using filters made
from controlled odor sources (“benchmark
filters”). For training mine detection, most
REST agencies plant test minefields, noting
each mine’s location, type and depth. Filters
can then be made in areas that should be contaminated with explosive odor from a known
source, and areas treated as free of explosive
odor. With a variety of odor sources used, it
is assumed that background odor is consistently variable across filters, and the detectors
must therefore use the explosive odor’s presence or absence as the determining variable
in their analysis. A key benefit of REST analysis over field-based animal-detection systems
is that benchmark filters can be mixed in with
operational filters, allowing the continuous
monitoring of each detector’s reliability during
operational analysis.
All REST agencies use a training system in
which hits on positive benchmark filters are
reinforced, typically using a toy or food. Correct rejections of negative filters are not reinforced because they do not provide a discrete
behavioral unit (the detector moves past the
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negative filter without being rewarded for its
correct “response”). This training methodology potentially introduces response bias, most
likely as a tendency to give an indication response on a negative filter (a false alarm). Thus,
the training procedure itself may be a source of
false alarms, limiting the agency’s ability to attain the objective of minimizing false alarms
while maintaining a reliably high hit rate.
Signal-detection theory3 gives the issues
and principles discussed above detailed technical analysis, and we use that theory’s language in this paper. With respect to REST’S
two objectives of maintaining high hit and low
false-alarm rates, the theory distinguishes two
processes affecting accuracy:
• Sensitivity: The dog’s ability to discriminate between positive and negative filters
can be improved in a variety of ways, including increasing the overall reinforcement rate for correct responses.4
• Response bias: If the training or operational experiences have asymmetries (such
as only rewarding responses to positive
filters during training or more abundant
negative filters than positive filters, which
is expected for operational filters), then response asymmetries are also expected. 5,6
Under signal-detection theory, all filters
contain a background odor (noise).
Positive filters should carry an additional
odor from the explosive ordnance (signal-plusnoise).3,7 A filter’s signal strength can be placed
somewhere in the area under two normally distributed Gaussian functions plotting signal intensity as a function of that odor’s probability
of being present (Figure 3 on page 66). Signal
availability to the left of line “C” will result in
an “ignore” response (filter is negative), whereas signal availability to the right of C will result
in an “indication” response (filter is positive).
Sensitivity (d’) is determined by the separation
between the peaks. Greater separation should
result in greater accuracy because positive filters are less easily confused with negative.

Figure 1: Dog searching filters in a carousel-style presentation system.

Signal-detection theory assumes that each animal responds according to a response criterion (the vertical line C in Figure 3 on page 66). An
animal’s responses can become biased toward one response type if more
reinforcement is made available for one response type over another or if
unequal numbers of positive and negative filters are presented.6
Signal-detection theory makes the following predictions:8
• If the sensitivity of the detector (d’) varies and the response criterion
(C) remains constant, hit rate and false-alarm rate should be negatively correlated; i.e., as the functions move apart, hit rate will increase, and false-alarm rate will decrease.
• If the response criterion (C) varies, hit rate should be positively correlated with false-alarm rate. For example, if a detector is biased toward indicating, it will hit more positive filters, but will also indicate
more negative filters, creating a high false-alarm rate.
• A strong correlation between hit and false-alarm rate would be a useful finding for REST.
• If hit and false-alarm rates were positively correlated, the relationship between them could be optimized by manipulating reinforcement bias, filter ratios, or the experimental method.
• If hit and false-alarm rates were negatively correlated, the training
approach could focus on increasing hit rate, with the desired low
false alarm-rate achieved without explicit training.
The present experiment used data from the regular training of six
REST dogs in Angola to explore the relationship between hit and falsealarm rates. The overall reinforcement rate for positive-filter hits was
manipulated across 28 weeks of a calendar year, according to Table 2 on
page 66. The proportion of negative filters was held constant (between 94
and 99 percent of filters presented were negative).
It was expected that hit rate and false-alarm rate would be correlated. Given that only reinforcement for hits was varied, increasing reinforcement availability for hits could have produced a bias toward indicating,
producing a positive correlation between hit and false-alarm rate. If, however, the reinforcement-rate manipulation for hits altered the dog’s sensitivity to the signal, we would expect a negative correlation between hit and
false-alarm rate. In other words, increasing reinforcement for hits would
either have been expected to cause a bias toward indicating or to improve
the dog’s ability to discriminate between positive and negative filters.

Figure 2: Dog indicating a filter in the line-stand presentation system.

Apparatus. Filters were placed on a carousel apparatus (Figure 1). The
carousel was a large stainless-steel wheel, mounted horizontally to the
floor, which could be rotated. Filters were mounted horizontally at the
ends of 12 arms that were removable for cleaning. The rooms’ walls were
concrete block, and tiled floors minimized odor contamination. A stainless-steel screen inside the rooms shielded a supervisor from the searching dog. All other personnel (the dog handler and documenter) watched
activities from adjacent rooms through internal one-way glass windows.
The filters were a PVC core wrapped in mosquito netting and housed
inside a PVC tube (known as the “Mechem” filter, named for the manufacturer).
Procedure Sampling. Unused filters were contaminated with air to
produce positive filters (filters believed to contain the odor from one or
more landmines) and negative filters (filters believed to be free of explo-
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Percentage of Hits Reinforced

6-10
11-27
28-33

Low
Medium
High

20-30
35-50
60-75

Table 2: Experimental conditions.

sive odor but containing other neutral odors from similar locations). Air
was added to the filters by placing the filters at the end of a long stainless-steel tube subject to continuous suction via a vacuum-pump machine worn as a backpack. The filter was held close to the ground and
swung to the left and the right of the pump operator as he slowly walked
a 100-meter distance. Filters were considered positive if the pump operator passed within 1 meter of a buried landmine and negative if no
landmines were present within 100 meters of the filter during sampling.
The landmines were a range of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines commonly found in Angola. The mines were laid between 0 and 10 centimeters (0–4 inches) beneath the ground surface for a minimum of six
months before they were used for sampling. A total of 275 mines were
available for sampling. All sampled filters were stored inside small PVC
containers, and positive filters were stored separately from negative filters until analysis to avoid odor cross-contamination.
Analysis. The dogs searched filters on the carousel between 8 a.m.
and 1p.m., Monday through Friday, taking rest breaks when required.
After preparation of the carousel, each dog was brought to the carousel
room’s door in a sequential but random order. When the dog was calm,
the handler instructed the dog to “search,” and the dog handler stepped
behind a wall out of the dog’s view. The dogs walked unaccompanied,
off-lead, in an anti-clockwise direction around the carousel, sniffing
each filter consecutively. The dog exited the room after it had correct-

ters because the reinforcer for blank runs was not contingent upon a discrete response, such as sitting. Zero to three positive filters were present
on the carousel among the remaining negative filters.
After the summer break, training recommenced for all six dogs in
Week 2 of 2005 and continued for four weeks before experimental manipulations. At this point, reinforcement frequency for correct indications on positive filters was manipulated by providing a reinforcer, such
as a click from the clicker and food or access to a ball, on only some
correct indications (intermittent reinforcement). This can be contrasted with earlier training stages where reinforcing every correct indication is common in order to aid learning (continuous reinforcement). All
other variables were held constant, including the number of negative filters available on the carousel, and reinforcement for correct rejections
of negative filters.
Table 2 shows the experimental conditions. From Weeks 6 to 10,
hit reinforcers were held at a “low” level (20 to 30 percent of hits were
reinforced), from Weeks 11 to 27 at a “medium” level (35 to 50 percent) and from Weeks 28 to 33, at a “high” level (60 to 75 percent of
hits were reinforced).
Results
A decision for each filter from each dog was obtained. Signal-detection theory terminology was used to define the four analysis results possible for a filter: hit (indication on a positive filter), miss (no indication on
a positive filter), false alarm (FA, indication on a negative filter) and correct rejection (CR, no indication on a negative filter). Hits, misses, false
alarms, and correct rejections were summed for each week for each dog
and used to calculate hit rates [(hits / (hits + misses) *100] and falsealarm rates [(FAs / FAs + CRs)*100].

100

10

80

Zante

60

r = -.77*

40

Probability of occurrence

S+N

N

2

0

0

100

10

80

Tan

Zulu

60
40

6
4

20

2

0

0

100

10

80

Retzina

60

r = -.40, NS

r = -.40*

40

8

Rusty

6
4

20

2

10

0

10

6

r = -.72*

40

5

8

Mean

15

20

25

30

0
35

Hit Rate
FA Rate

4

20

2
5

10

15

20

25

30

0
35

Week

Explosive-odor intensity
Figure 3: Hypothetical noise and signal-plus-noise distributions in a sensory discrimination task according to signal-detection theory. The left panel
demonstrates discriminability (d’) as the distance between the means of the two functions. The right panel illustrates the animal’s response criterion
(C), which dissects the two functions and can shift to the left and right as a function of response bias.

ly indicated a positive filter by sitting next to it and hearing the conditioned reinforcer (clicker), or when the dog handler called it from the
room. Reinforcement was occasionally available for hits (indicating a
known positive filter). The reward most often delivered was small pieces
of dry dog food and sometimes access to a ball or squeaky toy. A reward
was occasionally delivered following a “blank” run (a run containing
only negative filters), if the dog correctly ignored all filters. However, the
reward may not have acted to reinforce correct responses to negative fil-
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conditions [F(2, 15) = 0.89, p >.05]. However,
Figure 6 ( on page 68) shows that false-alarm
rate was lowest during the medium-reinforcement rate condition for four of the six dogs,
and for the mean.

False Alarm rate (%)

Reinforcement Level

Hit rate (%)

Weeks
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Figure 4 shows hit and false alarm rates for all individual dogs, and
for the mean across all dogs, as a function of week. When actual reinforcement rates were found to deviate from planned reinforcement rates,
these data were removed, and are therefore missing from Figure 4. Pearson correlation coefficients were used to test the relatedness of hit rate
to false-alarm rate shown in Figure 4. A significant, negative correlation
appeared between mean hit rate and mean false-alarm rate (r = -.72, p =
.000). The correlation between hit and false-alarm rate was also negative

Figure 4: Hit (red circles) and false-alarm (yellow circles) rates calculated as percentages for
each week for all six dogs and for the mean across dogs. Vertical dotted lines show changes
in reinforcement level for hits from low, to medium, to high from left to right across the x-axis.
Pearson correlation coefficients are given for each dog, and for the mean, and are significant
(p<.05) unless shown (NS).

for all individual dogs and significantly so for two of the six dogs. All r values are shown in Figure
4. Figure 5 (on page 68) displays the data used to calculate the mean correlation and clearly shows
a strong negative relationship between hit and false-alarm rate, in that, as hit rate increases, falsealarm rate decreases.
Weekly hit and false-alarm rates for each dog, and for the mean, were grouped according to
reinforcement-rate condition (low, medium, and high). These data are shown in Figure 6 (on page
68). A one-way analysis of variance indicated that hit rates in the three groups differed significantly [F(2, 15) = 5.34, p < .05]. A Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test9 showed that the medium and high reinforcement rates produced significantly higher hit rates than the low reinforcement rate condition,
but that the medium and high conditions did not differ significantly from one another in terms of
hit rate. No significant difference in false-alarm rates were found across the three reinforcement

Discussion
Hit rate and false-alarm rate were overall
significantly negatively correlated.
Thus, as hit rate increased, false alarms decreased. According to signal-detection theory,
these negative correlations are to be expected
if the distance between the noise peaks and the
signal-plus-noise functions changed. In other
words, the correlations between hit and falsealarm rate were caused either by changing discriminability between positive and negative
filters, or by changing the dog’s sensitivity to
the odor, and not by changing response bias
(decision criterion). Given that the filters’ discriminability was not manipulated, the likely
reason for the negative correlation between hit
and false alarm rate was the dog’s increasing
sensitivity due to changes in the overall reinforcement rate for hits.
This result suggests that the experimental method’s nature, reinforcing hits and not
correct rejections, does not produce changes in the dog’s response bias. In other words,
greater reinforcer availability for hits did not
cause a bias toward indicating. Instead, in the
present experiment, low reinforcement rates
for hits produced poorer performance on negative and positive filters, while medium and
high reinforcement levels produced more accurate responses on both filter types. In the
present experiment, performance peaked under the medium level of hit reinforcement. Increasing the reinforcement frequency beyond
this medium level did not result in greater accuracy on positive or negative filters. One implication of this finding is that procedures to
improve the REST system’s accuracy should
focus on increasing the animals’ hit rates, and
that any hit rate increase will be accompanied
by a false-alarm rate decrease.
Manipulating reinforcement ratios is one
way to alter an animal’s response accuracy.
Another way is through the experimental procedure itself. The current procedure was a “go/
no-go” procedure, whereby animals indicated, by sitting, the presence of explosive odor
but made no response to filters containing no
explosive odor. Such a procedure producing a
bias toward indicating, rather than ignoring,
is possible because ignoring is not explicitly
reinforced. Alternatively, due to the greater
numbers of negative filters (between 94 percent and 99 percent of filters were negative),
the dog’s behavior could become biased toward ignoring because it is the most frequently-required response. An analysis of bias, using
[log b = ½ log (FA / Hits)(CR / Miss)], showed
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Figure 5: MeanHit
hit rate
rate as
false-alarm rate. A straight line has been fit
to the data to illustrate the pattern represented by the datum points.
that the behavior of four of the six dogs was biased toward indicating, and this bias strength
decreased as reinforcement for hits increased
for all six dogs. The behavior of two dogs was
biased toward ignoring, and this bias was unaffected by reinforcement-rate manipulations.
Thus, the present procedure appeared to not
produce consistent effects on response bias,
nor did it produce bias in one direction over
another. Instead, each dog tended to maintain
a fairly reliable preference for either indicating or ignoring, and biases toward indicating
were counter-intuitively reduced by increasing reinforcement availability for correct indications.
REST programs should include ongoing
monitoring of response bias, so they can redress any imbalance. Manipulation of reinforcement rates can eliminate response bias
more easily in procedures where responses to
positive and negative filters are directly reinforced. In procedures where responses to only
one type of filter are reinforced, such as in the
present REST system, response bias may be
eliminated by careful manipulation of the ratio between positive and negative filters. REST
programs should seek to determine the optimum ratio for their procedure and animals,
and maintain this ratio while continuing to
monitor ongoing response bias.
Other factors which affect the overall accuracy of animals’ responses concern the
quality of the samples. Sampling can be optimized in terms of filter material, climatic condition, avoidance of contamination, and so on.
Once collected, filters should be handled to
minimize cross-contamination. By maintaining as clear a signal on the filter as possible,
the animal is given the best chance to obtain
high hit rates.
		
see endnotes page 82
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for mine action, but the Advanced Intelligence Decision Support System is the first mine-action technology
to successfully combine remote sensing with advanced intelligence methodology. The result is a rigorously
operationally validated system that improves hazardous risk assessment for greater efficiency in land cancellation
and release. This article discusses the components of the AI DSS system and its achievements in mine action.
by Milan Bajić [ University of Zagreb ]
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Application of AI DSS in the community. Figure 1.1 (left): The state of the mine-suspected area (56 square kilometers) before the project. (Legend:
crossed pink for undergoing clearance, striped pink for undergoing survey, yellow if used on owner’s responsibility, blue if excluded from MSA.)
Figure 1.2 (right): The state of the MSA after the application of AI DSS, as carried out by CROMAC. Note the MSA reduction in the southern part
of the MSA polygon at the ridge of Velebit Mountain. (Legend: crossed pink for undergoing clearance, striped pink for undergoing survey, yellow if
used on owner’s responsibility, blue if excluded from MSA.)

L

ongstanding research into aerial and spaceborne remote sensing for
mine action1,2,3,4,5,6,7 led to the creation of the first operational system
for this purpose as recently as 2008–09.8 Although the remote sensing
methodology and technology were the system’s basis, only significant
use of the general-intelligence approach, known as the Space and Airborne Mined Area Reduction Tools7 (SMART) system, made its substantial operational success in mine action possible.9
Well-developed mine-action programs implement conventional
technologies and standard operating procedures of General Survey (also

called Non-technical Survey) and reduction of mine-suspected areas10
while International Mine Action Standards define wider and more general aspects of general mine-action assessment11 and land release.12
Development of AI DSS
The Croatian Mine Action Centre tries to reduce mine-suspected areas10 by using conventional technologies such as General Surveys;
however, the repeated use of these mechanisms eventually becomes ineffective and ground-based costly means (demining, Technical Survey)
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Figure 3: Changes of MSA at the ridge of the Velebit Mountain after the AI DSS project. (Legend: Crossed pink for undergoing clearance,
blue if excluded from MSA.)

2604500
sq. m
Figure 2.1 (left): Example of the area excluded from the MSA in the central part of the MSA in Gospić, shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Figure 3.1
shows the state of the MSA before application of the AI DSS project. Figure 2.2 (right): The application of the project’s results by CROMAC. (Legend: crossed pink for undergoing clearance, striped pink for undergoing survey, yellow if used on owner’s responsibility, blue if excluded from MSA.)

must then be used. CROMAC has tried to reduce these costs by supporting the development
of more efficient technologies.7,6,13
Hopes of such a cost-effective solution
arose through the development of the SMART
system, an advanced intelligence system that
projects such as the one funded by the European Commission from 2001–04 have operationally validated.7 The methodology of
SMART used a general approach to the information sources, made the role of the minescene interpreter easier and introduced expert
knowledge management, although the majority of efforts focused on processing and interpreting the aerial and satellite imagery.7,14
Unfortunately, though recognized as potentially helpful operationally, SMART was
not successful as an integrated system that
could be used with other mine-action technologies. In an effort to reconcile the intelligence system with operational purposes, our
experience and work on several research and
development or Technology Demonstration
projects allowed us to develop a cost-effective
solution, the Advanced Intelligence Decision
Support System,9 which incorporates the generic methodology of the SMART intelligence
system with the processes of hazardous-risk
assessment and land release.9,13,15,16
In 2008–09, the AI DSS was implemented
and proved effective in three Croatian communities where conventional ground-based
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technology is not applicable (excluding manual demining and Technical Survey). Satellite
imagery and multisensor airborne imagery
served as the data’s main sources. CROMAC’s
use of AI DSS has resulted in increased land
cancellation/release and improved hazardousrisk assessment. AI DSS was applied in Croatia,
and its application is underway in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.17 Other countries could benefit from
its use as well through regional cooperation and
capacity-building efforts.9,18
Advanced Intelligence Methodology
and Technology
The AI DSS is a system and technology that
combines the following main subsystems:
• Analytic assessments and derivation of
statements of operational needs about the
data availability and quality, and information in the Mine Information System and
Geographic Information System of the
MAC. The experts within CROMAC made
these assessments and derivations.8,17
• The airborne multisensor acquisition system and satellite imagery usage, which
provide new data about an MSA’s state,
such as the indicators of mine presence
and indicators of mine absence, with high
accuracy and confidence.13 The scientists
from the Faculty of Geodesy at the University of Zagreb, in cooperation with other
researchers and pilots, applied this sub-
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system. This partnership proved very successful in Croatia and in BiH.8,17
• The subsystem for multi-level fusion and
multi-criteria, multi-objective processing,
and interpretation and production of outputs, operated by remote-sensing scientists and researchers from the Faculty of
Geodesy at the University of Zagreb.16
SMART’s generic methodology and its
theoretical background are presented in several references.7,15,14 Therefore only AI DSS
advancements that go beyond the SMART
system are described in the following sections.
Generating the statement of needs. The
intelligence applied in AI DSS serves to reconstruct the spatial, temporal and situational
state at the scene during and after the minelaying process. It starts with a data overview—
information existing in the MAC’s Mine
Information System. If military maps and/or
other military documents are available (e.g.,
orders, commands and reports), they are used
to define the situation at the MSA. Also, operational division experts in the MAC derive the
statement of operational needs as the set of requirements related to the missing, incomplete
or low-quality data, and methods and technologies that can be used for their collection or
for improving their quality. Not every MAC
uses this process; it was developed and defined
only for the needs of the earlier research and
development projects, SMART and Airborne

Minefield Area Reduction (ARC) project,6,7,13 and was successfully applied in the first operational project.8 The statement of operational needs
will contain:
•
The MSA’s analytical description and assessment
•
Map reconstruction of the minefield polygons based on the available minefield records and other data in the Mine Information
System of the MAC
Derivation of general and particular requirements. Once the statement of operational needs is derived, the next step is developing two
requirement types: the general and the particular requirements for collecting new data to replace missing or unreliable data or for improving information quality. The general requirements include analyzing
data on mine barriers, exploring mine incidents, analyzing military and
U.N. demining records and maps, and examining land conditions where
military operations occurred. The particular requirements are a set of
hypotheses based on available data sources in the MAC, and they present desired results of the AI DSS application. In Croatia, due to environmental changes at the scene that happened after the minefields were
laid, along with a lack of available data, only a percentage of the particular requirements and hypotheses derived in CROMAC were achievable.

Figure 4: This diagram displays the correlation between the degree of
slope and the area of MSA at the ridge of Velebit Mountain. The total
area of MSA on Velebit’s ridge is 23.64 sq km, with 4.36 sq km of that
land having a slope of greater than or equal to 35 degrees.

Nevertheless, the airborne and spaceborne imagery processing and interpretation can still provide valuable evidence about the indicators of
mine presence and indicators of mine absence at the mined scene.
When the system is implemented and results are collected and delivered to the MAC, the next phase starts: application of the project results
in the MAC. The project results in this phase need to pass the SOPs for
result verification for General Survey within the MAC.10 Project results
in Croatia show that this verification process increases benefits produced by the project.8
Assessing the terrain's impact. Observing terrain characteristics as
a means for identifying indicators of mine absence has proved valuable.
In the SMART project report from 2005,7 only several kinds of indicators of mine absence were considered, so the addition of terrain features as indicators of mine absence marked one AI DSS advancement.8
In the community of Gospić, one of the three communities in Croatia
where the project was implemented, the Velebit Mountain ridge was in
the MSA (see Figure 1.1 and 1.2 on page 69) with sparse evidence of the
minefields and military positions. The terrain’s slopes are the main features for the accessibility evaluation and were analyzed for Velebit (see
Figure 3) in Gospić and are shown in Figure 4. The AI DSS application
results provided evidence that enabled CROMAC to exclude an MSA at
the Velebit Mountain ridge, except on several small areas (see Figure 3).
Evaluating quality of data/information. The quantitative evaluation
of the data quality, information and knowledge (from here on referred
to just as data) is one of AI DSS’s important functions. It should cover:
• Data provided by the Mine Information System of the MAC
• Data collected and derived in AI DSS by airborne multisensor acquisition, by use of satellite multispectral imagery, derived contextual
information and experts’ knowledge
Evaluation of AI DSS sourced data will be considered later. The evaluation of the Mine Information System sourced data should assess the probability of the data’s accuracy, confidence and completeness as the main
features of data quality; these are considered in the following sections.
Minefield records. Minefield records, if available, are usually the
most valuable sources of minefield data. In Croatia and in BiH, the
minefield records have similar structures and usually have 39 variables (e.g., cartographical data, minefield characteristics, number of
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Military maps. Military maps, if they exist and are available, can
provide information about the war history on the considered terrain and
improve understanding about the spatial and temporal distribution of
the units and the minefields. The most usable—although rarely available—are the maps of the engineers’ activities; they contain details of
the spatial and temporal placement of minefields. The maps of higher
ranked military personnel contain less data about the minefields but can
provide contextual information about the scene. Separation lines, distribution of subunits and engineers’ preparation support the scene reconstruction and can provide the spatial frame for the detected indicators
of mine presence or mine absence.
In the operational project in Croatia, 8 military maps became available at the middle of the project, and their contribution was not used for
the whole area or at every point during the project. In the operational
project in BiH,17 the military maps were not available at all, but deminers who participated in the war reconstructed the battle-situation maps.
Besides the military maps, auxiliary map sources can include memoirs of former military commanders. Although edited for publishing,
these memoirs can add missing spatial, temporal and situational contextual information. In the operational project in Croatia, 8 the memoirs
were used in the analytic assessment of the MSA status and helped to
better understand the MSA site’s behavior.

Figure 5.1 (left): Digital orthophoto map scale 1:2000; aerial images acquired in 2006. Figure 5.2 (right): Satellite image of the same area, acquired
in 2006. Trenches (long zigzag line) are clearly visible.

landmines, etc.)8,17 while in other countries—
Azerbaijan, for example—the records are not
available. The records sometimes have sketches of the minefield.
It is widely known that minefield records
are seldom complete and that their accuracy
and confidence are not high enough. At the
MAC, experts reconstruct polygons of the
minefields on the map and consider all data
available in the minefield records, military
maps and documents. The 39 variables of the
minefield records differ: 21 of them are more
important than the others (e.g., position of the
minefield, its shape, orientation and the reference point of the coordinates) for the spatial, structural and temporal assessment of
the minefields.
When CROMAC examined 122 MSA
minefield records in Gospić, 8 completeness
and positioning accuracy was compared for
39 variables/21 variables/positioning accuracy, as estimated by experts, and was shown to
vary among the three. In previous R&D projects7,6 the quality of the minefield records was
not considered. The importance of minefieldrecord quality is now recognized in the current operational project.17 Further research of
the variables’ behavior (completeness and positioning accuracy, relationship between variables, factor analysis, etc.) is underway and
new statistical models are expected.
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Aerial digital orthophoto maps as sources
of indicators of mine presence. Aerial digital
orthophoto maps, if they exist, are very important for AI DSS application. They serve as
the cartographic reference that optimizes spatial accuracy of AI DSS products. In the preparation phase for AI DSS application they can
be an auxiliary data source for strong indicators of mine presence, e.g., trenches, bunkers,
shelters, unused paths, bridges, etc. However
the digital orthophoto maps alone are not sufficient indicators of mine presence.
In the considered projects8,17 two types of
digital orthophoto maps were available: panchromatic at the scale 1:5000 and color at the
scale 1:2000. If the digital orthophoto maps are
acquired in different years, as was the case in
the 2008 International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance project,8 they
can serve as valuable tools for detecting changes
over time. The quality of the digital orthophoto
maps in ITF’s project was limited due to the following constraints:
•
The acquisition time was wrongly selected when vegetation (forests, agricultural
fields) was high and leaves obscured the
ground’s surface. This problem is a consequence of the false assumption that
detecting fields in use by their owners
will lead to the most MSA reductions
(see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
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The MSA borders delineated the digital orthophoto area at the fine scale
(1:2000). Due to this mistake the digital orthophoto maps did not cover areas
outside the official MSA. Note that in
Gospić, 6 sq km was added to the previously determined MSA, and the digital
orthophoto map did not cover this area.
•
The radiometric compression decreased
the digital orthophoto map utility for
remnants-of-war detection.
The quality of the aerial digital orthophoto
map that has a ground resolving distance of
0.20 m is weaker for the detection of the remnants of war than the satellite image that has a
ground resolving distance of 1 m.

Importance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Indicators of Mine Absence (IMA)
Houses in use
Areas in use
Roads in use
Step terrain, slope greater than 30 degrees

Importance
1
1
1
1

Table 1: A list of the indicators of mine presence, indicators of mine
absence and importance rank given by an expert for the MSA in the
community of Gospić.8

•

Figure 6: Example of the fortification objects, remnants of war marked with arrows,
triangles or circles visible on the aerial image that was acquired in April 2009 at the
MSA community of Gospic´ .8

Indicators of Mine Presence (IMP)
Mineﬁeld records
Mine accidents
Table marking of the mineﬁeld
Fortiﬁcations
Trenches
Bunkers
Natural objects modiﬁed to serve for ﬁre action
Dry wall (in a battle area)
Shelters for artillery, vehicles, infantry
Bridges, passes of water ways
Dominant hill
Edges of forest
Fords
Helicopter landing area
Roads not in use (in a battle area)
Abandoned overgrown areas
Demolished houses (in a ﬁrst front line)
Observation posts (usually for hunting)

Figures 7.1 (above) and 7.2 (left): Pod with sensors
installed on the fuselage of the helicopters Mi-8
and Bell 206. The moving map supports navigation and acquired images are stored on the external hard disks. Two or three operators control the
aerial acquisition. The standard operating procedures that include pre-flight and post-flight operational calibration are developed for general aerial
multisensor imagery acquisition. The particular
SOPs are developed for mine-action survey and
surveillance of the sea oil spills are under continuous advancement.

Derivation of requirements for acquiring data by aerial multisensor survey. The general and particular requirements derived by data
analysis available in the Mine Information System of the MAC are tested
regarding vegetation and snow cover, as well as the expected indicators
of mine presence and indicators of mine absence, types, dimensions and
shapes. The output of this process is a list of the objects the aerial multisensor system is expected to detect. The airborne sensors’ operational
parameters will provide necessary spatial, spectral and radiometric resolution in imagery, as well as the surveyed area’s spatial coverage.

Multisensor aerial imagery acquisition. The multisensor aerial system used in mine action’s first operational remote-sensing project8 and
in current use,17 was developed and realized in the project funded by the
Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia13
(Figures 7.1 and 7.2). The installation on the aerial platform (helicopters
Mi-8 and Bell 206, airplane Cessna 172R) takes less than two hours. The
system enables imagery acquisition in the strip mode and in a sequence
of the frames. Width of the strip is 30% of the flight altitude above the
terrain. The cruising speed is from 90 to 130 km/h; endurance is up to
4h 15min (platform Mi-8). This is an electro-optical acquisition system
that covers wavelengths from 400 to 900 nm and from 8 to 14 µm, with
several sensors. The hyperspectral scanner in imaging mode provides a
strip mode image in 95 channels, in wavelengths 430 to 900 nm, using
a multispectral camera in visible and near infrared bands. The inertial
navigational unit is integrated into the pod’s sensor system and enables
parametric geocoding of the hyperspectral scanner’s data.
Extraction of data and formalization of experts’ knowledge. The
preparation phase finishes after terrain analysis, after the multisensor
aerial imagery acquisition and after obtaining the satellite multispectral
imagery. The next phase is data extraction from these sources and information-quality assessment. This phase also includes a formalization
of the experts’ knowledge, which provides contextual information correlated with the particular terrain. The objects that should be detected
are defined as the indicators of mine presence and the indicators of mine
absence; this is a valuable contribution from the previous R&D projects2,5,6,7,16 (see example in Table 1).
The data extraction is used by different remote-sensing interpretation methods and by subjective interpretation supported by different
techniques (imagery enhancement, feature mapping, principal component analysis, etc). Experience from the operational projects 8,17 shows
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that the subjective computer-assisted indicators of mine presence extraction was the most efficient solution for the extraction of the remnants of war and similar objects (see Figure 7 on page 72). There are
more efficient classification methods for indicators of mine absence
extraction that usually cover larger areas. The goal of the considered
activity is extract indicators of mine presence and indicators of mine
absence with high probability and at the same time provide very high
confidence. For this purpose, we use images from one, two or more imagery sources until the accuracy of the detection and/or classification
of the indicators of mine presence, indicators of mine absence and their

respective confidences reach high thresholds.
Multi-level fusion, fuzzy classification and hazardous-risk maps.
The next step in processing data is rather complex; it includes multilevel fusion, data fuzzification, fuzzy classification, multi-criteria and
multi-objective decision support processes. Also, danger maps and the
maps of the confidence and stability must be produced. The original
source for these terms is SMART 7 and will not be discussed here. For
CROMAC, the most pertinent information was the map of proposals
for the MSA exclusion and inclusion.16,8 See Figures 8.1 and 8.2 for the
map of the indicators of mine presence and indicators of mine absence.

Mine Action Centre
MIS (mine ﬁeld records, incidents, accidents,
survey, QA).
Scanned maps scale 1:5000, 1:2000, aerial
digintal ortho photo maps scale 1:5000, 1:2000
only for MSA.
Aerial digital elevation model (DEM) for 3D
vizualisation of the terrain.
Scanned military maps.
War history data, data about explosive barriers.

Application of the results delivered by AI DSS.
Exclusion from the MSA, inclusion in MSA,
recategorization.

Advanced Intelligence Decision Support System
MIS (Mine ﬁeld records, incidents, accidents, survey,
QA).
Scanned maps scale 1:5000, 1:2000, aerial digital ortho
photo maps scale 1:5000, 1:2000
Satellite maps at the scale 1:5000 for areas of MSA and
outside of MSA.
Aerial digital elevation model (DEM) for 3D visualization of the terrian. Aerial and satellite DEM for
quantitative spatial analyses of the terrain and for 3D
visualization.
Scanned military maps.
War history data, data about explosive barriers.
Analytic assessment of the mine suspected area (MSA).
Statistical evaluation and quality assessment of all data
used in AI DSS: completeness, probability, conﬁdence,
sensitivity.
Detection and extraction of the indicators of mine
presence (IMP) and mine absence (IMA) in the satellite images, airborne multisensor images, digital orthophoto map (DOF) (if usable). Assessment of quality,
conﬁdence.
Collecting and processing of the contextual data and
information.
Formalization of experts’ knowledge: membership
function, relative importance of IMP.
Quantitative spatial analyses of the terrain. Detection
and extraction of the indicators of mine absence (IMA)
Processing of the multisensor aerial and satellite imagery. Detection and extraction of the strong indicators
of mine presence IMP. Classiﬁcation and extraction of
indicators of mine presence IMP and absence IMA. Assessment of detection probability and conﬁdence.
Delivery of the AI DSS results: danger map, conﬁdence
map, proposal for reduction, for re-categorisation, for
inclusion areas into MSA, maps of conﬂicts between
MIS and AI DSS results.
Feedback to AI DSS, assessment of the cost-beneﬁt ratio. Evaluation of the collected new experience, inclusion into the methodology of the AI DSS.

Milan Bajić, Ph.D, Lt. Colonel (Ret), is Professor of Remote Sensing at the Faculty of Geodesy at the University of Zagreb,
Croatia. He led Croatian teams in the European Commission’s R&D projects about
airborne remote sensing for mine action
(SMART, ARC), in the national technology project that led to AI DSS use in Croatia
and a similar project in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has authored more than 40 scientific papers, a book on radar antennas and
several papers presented at conferences.
Prof. Milan Bajić, Ph.D.
Faculty of the Geodesy University of Zagreb
Kac̆ićeva 26
10000 Zagreb / Croatia
Tel: +385 98 460 917
E-mail: milan.bajic@zg.t-com.hr

Table 2: This table shows the difference in functions between the MAC and the AI DSS. New
content is shown in red.

Functionalities of the AI DSS and CROMAC. Between the processes of the General
Survey in CROMAC10 and the Advanced Intelligence Decision Support System8,17 commonalities exist in their functions and data.
However AI DSS also introduces new functionalities, as seen in Table 2.

Figures 8.1 and 8.2: Indicators of mine presence and mine absence (except for Velebit Mountain in the southern part) shown over the MSA in Gospić. For Velebit Mountain, please see Figure 3 (on page 71). The map that visualizes conflicts of statements between MIS of MACs and the results
of the AI DSS project are also very suitable for further application of AI DSS results in MACs.16 A similar experience was obtained by the map that
shows detected indicators of mine presence and indicators of mine absence on the MSA as shown in the figures above.
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Implementation Results in Croatia
The three Croatian communities where
AI DSS was implemented had 104.97 sq km of
MSA and nearly 46 sq km outside of the MSA
prior to the project. The proposals for reducing MSAs with the highest level of accuracy
and reliability resulted in a suggested MSA reduction of 7.67 sq km to 23.34 sq km, and certain areas were proposed for MSA inclusion.8
The project results were delivered in September 2009 to CROMAC so it could make decisions about MSA additions and reductions in
accordance with its standard operating procedures.10 In July 2010 the AI DSS process results
as applied to the community of Gospić, Croatia, were available.19 See Figures 1.1, 1.2, 3, 8.1
and 8.2 for the map of Gospić. The results of
its successful application in Gospić were:8

• Exclusion of 28 sq km from 56 sq km of
MSA (i.e., MSA reduction)
• Inclusion of 6 sq km in MSA, new areas that
were not registered before in the Mine Information System as hazardous risk areas
• Re-categorization of areas inside MSA
(e.g., from “minefield” to “for survey”)
Similar activity started in June 2010 for
the community of Bilje; the results should be
available in late autumn 2010.
Conclusions
The Advanced Intelligence Decision Support System has met an important mine-action community need: finding a cost-effective
way to improve land cancellation and release.
The AI DSS cost-benefit ratio compared to that
of other systems aiming to exclude areas from
MSA proved more than 140:1. AI DSS is the
first system to combine airborne and spaceborne remote sensing with advanced intelligence for MSA assessment in an operationally
effective way. The system also enables a more
efficient resource allocation (minimizing costly Technical Surveys and demining in nonhazardous areas). Because of this success, Croatia,

along with other countries choosing to implement the system (such as BiH), is moving
closer to fulfilling the Ottawa Convention’s
Article 5 goals.
		

see endnotes page 82

Thanks to the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia, AI
DSS was developed and realized in 2007–08
as an operational system under one of its technology projects.13 Financial support was provided by the Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs with assistance from ITF, which supported operationalization and advancement of the AI DSS in
Croatia in 2008–09 and has a project underway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. CROMAC
provided data, information and expertise in
mine action as crucial operational support for
the project. The AI DSS is the result of continuous efforts of many researchers, mine-action experts, Croatian Air Force and Defense
pilots, research institutions, academia and
fruitful cooperation between Croatian and
European scientists. It was our privilege and
pleasure to work with all of them.
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Since its development in the early 1970s, scientists from an array of disciplines have found reason to utilize
ground-penetrating radar to create radar images of the subsurface. The following article examines how GPR use
in combination with standard metal detectors could aid workers in the field of demining.
by Kazunori Takahashi [ Leibniz Institute for Applied Geophysics ] and
Dieter Gülle [ Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement ]

A

n ITEP dual-sensor detector test, led by the Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffu (BWB), Germany’s Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement, took place September–October
2009 in Germany.1,2 Analysis of the test results clearly confirmed that
the tested dual-sensor detectors reduce false alarms and that their metal-detector parts are not deteriorated, in comparison to the base model
of a stand-alone metal detector used along with the GPR part of a dualsensor detector.
In this article, a dual-sensor detector refers to a combination of a
metal detector and GPR. The combination allows the detection and
identification of metal-containing objects; this combination is expected to contribute to the reduction of false alarms and, consequently, improve clearance-operation efficiency. This article provides an analysis
and overview of the test results. The test’s detailed descriptions, as well
as the results, can be found in the test report which will be available online soon. 3

Test Conditions
A test site was constructed at a BWB facility in Oberjettenberg, Bavaria, Germany. Three types of soil were prepared: laterite, magnetite
and humus. Laterite is a reddish clay loam with low stone (basalt) content. The soil has a very high magnetic susceptibility and is frequency dependent. Thus, it often causes metal detectors to give false alarms.
Magnetite, the second soil type, is coarse sand mixed with engineered
magnetite. The soil has a very high magnetic susceptibility but no frequency dependence. The third soil type is a loamy soil with a relatively
high humus content—about 10%. Test-soil properties are described in
detail in an accompanying report.4 Three types of mine-like targets, including rendered-safe mines, were planted in the soils: ERA calibration
target, Gyata-64 and PPM-2. In addition, various sizes of metal pieces,
such as bullets and cartridges, were buried as metal clutter. The burial
depths ranged from 2 to 15 centimeters (0.78 to 5.90 inches).
An advanced landmine-imaging system developed by Tohoku University, Japan5,6 participated in the test. Cambodian deminers, who were
trained by Tohoku University and attended previously conducted tests,
operated the dual-sensor detector.7 For the comparison, various models of commercial metal detectors, including the base metal detector of
ALIS (CEIA MIL-D1), as well as a commercial stand-alone GPR, were
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also tested. Operated by two scientists in the test, the stand-alone GPR
system is not specially designed for demining but for general non-destructive testing purposes. Since the stand-alone GPR is not integrated
with a metal detector, the system followed various models of stand-alone
metal detectors and performed only discrimination. Therefore, the detection performance of the stand-alone GPR cannot be discussed, and
only the discrimination performance is demonstrated.
The test was a blind test: The detector operators did not know the locations or the object types.8 Dual-sensor operators first used the metal-detector part of the device for detecting mine-suspected objects and
switched over to the GPR for discriminating mines from metals. Two
colors of markers were used to indicate the location and object type
(mine or metal) found in the search with a dual-sensor detector. Operators of stand-alone metal detectors simply used one color of markers.
After each test run, marker positions were measured with total stations.
Data Analysis
Data collected in the test was analyzed in the same way as analyzed
in “Data Analysis and Performance Evaluation of Japanese Dual-Sensor
Systems tested in Croatia” from The Journal of ERW and Mine Action,
Issue 13.3.9 Detection capability is evaluated by calculating probability of detection and false-alarm rate, and discrimination performance
is evaluated by false-alarm rate reduction and probability-of-detection
loss. The measures are defined as follows:

FAR =

Number of false alarms
Area searched

FAR reduction =

POD =

Number of rejected false alarms by GPR
Number of false alarms by metal detector

Number of detected targets
Number of buried targets

POD loss =

Number of rejected targets by GPR
Number of detected targets by metal detector

Objects used in the test. From left to right: metal clutter (ammunition belts, cartridges, bullets) and mine-like targets (Gyata-64, PPM2, ERA calibration target).
Photo courtesy of BWB

no mine will be missed, but also no false alarms will be rejected, meaning both probability-of-detection loss and false-alarm rate reduction are
very low. This is due to the fact that the device only provides information on the objects, and this information must be interpreted by the operator. Thus, the decision is entirely up to the operator. Nevertheless, the
figure clearly shows that GPR itself is potentially capable of discriminating landmines from metal pieces. However, from the operational point
of view, probability-of-detection loss must be kept as low as possible.
1

Results
To demonstrate an overview of the detectors’ performance, results
shown in this article are averaged overall soil types. These results, as well
as detailed interpretations, will be in the test report. 3
Figure 1 shows probability-of-detection versus false-alarm rate of
ALIS and stand-alone metal detectors. The metal-detector part of ALIS
(blue dot) achieved a result similar to its base metal detector (CEIA
MIL-D1, light blue cross). This result indicates that the metal-detector
performance integrated in ALIS is not deteriorated by the combined
GPR, and it is still as good as the base metal detector. The metal detector
part of ALIS declared approximately 2.5 false alarms per square meter,
and using the GPR sensor reduces it to about 1.4 false alarms, denoting
a 45% reduction. Consequently, the false-alarm rate obtained by ALIS is
lower than any other stand-alone metal detector tested in the campaign.
Since the metal detector is the primary sensor in ALIS, the detection
performance depends entirely on the base metal detector. In the soils
used in this test, the base metal detector achieved the lowest probability-of-detection among all tested detectors. Therefore, the probability-ofdetection obtained by ALIS is also low, but this is due to the base metal
detector’s performance.
False-alarm rate reduction and probability-of-detection loss are
plotted in Figure 2. The stand-alone GPR (red cross) achieved a remarkably high false-alarm rate reduction, indicating that approximately 90%
of the false alarms are correctly identified. Furthermore, the false-alarm
rate reduction by ALIS is much lower, meaning more metal pieces were
misidentified and left as mines by ALIS as compared to the stand-alone
GPR. On the other hand, the stand-alone GPR missed more mines than
ALIS. It is difficult to grade the devices because the results can change
with each operator. If an operator is afraid of missing mines and reports mines for all metal-containing objects the metal detector signals,

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6

POD

ITEP Evaluation of Metal Detectors
and Dual-sensor Detectors

Probability-of-detection ranging from 0% to 100% indicate how often targets are found, and a higher value indicates a better performance.
False-alarm rate shows how many false positive indications (false
alarms, alarms from other than target) are obtained in one square meter,
and a lower value indicates better performance. False-alarm rate reduction indicates how many false alarms the GPR use decreases the number
of false alarms found with the metal-detector alone. False-alarm rate
reduction of 100% means that GPR use successfully discriminates and
rejects all false alarms, and 0% means that no false alarms are rejected.
This measure directly relates to efficiency improvements.
Probability-of-detection loss indicates how many mines detected by
the metal-detector part are falsely identified as metals and rejected by
the GPR. A 0% probability-of-detection loss means all mines are correctly recognized as mines, and a 100% probability-of-detection loss
means all mines are falsely rejected. This measure is directly related to
the safety of deminers.
Probability-of-detection and false-alarm rate can be calculated at
two stages of the dual-sensor detector’s operation: after using only the
metal-detector feature and after using both sensors. On the other hand,
false-alarm rate reduction and probability-of-detection loss can only be
calculated after using both sensors. This means that both can be considered to be performance measures of the dual-sensor detectors’ GPR
sensor.
Note that in this data analysis, unlike previously-conducted standalone metal-detector trials, metal pieces are considered a source of false
alarms, not true positives. In this data analysis, only mine-like objects
are considered the source of true positives (see Table 1 below from our
earlier article).9 This is because dual-sensor detectors are supposed to
discriminate mines from metals. In this article, this categorization is
applied to stand-alone metal detectors as well so that their results can be
directly compared to those of the dual-sensor detectors.
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ALIS − MD
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Figure 1: Probability-of-detection versus false-alarm rate of ALIS and
stand-alone metal detectors, in all soil types averaged. The error bars
show 95% confidence bounds. For ALIS, the dot and circle indicate
before and after discrimination respectively.

Figures 3a and 3b (on page 78) shows false-alarm rate reduction and
probability-of-detection loss as a function of depth. As a tendency, ALIS
and the stand-alone GPR achieved lower false-alarm rate reductions and
higher probability-of-detection losses at shallow depths, which confirms
the results in a former test.10 The depth dependency looks weaker for
ALIS, especially at the shallowest depth range of 0–3 centimeters in both
false-alarm rate reduction and probability-of-detection loss. This variance might be due to the difference in signal processing employed in the
systems and the GPR data’s representation to the operators. The stand-
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1

be equal to the search time plus the time for excavation (and other processes). The search time can be expressed as the time for searching one
metal-containing object (ts) multiplied by the number of objects found,
x. In a similar manner, the time for excavation can be expressed as the
time for excavating one object (te) multiplied by the number of objects, x.
Assuming ALIS needs twice the search time of a stand-alone metal
detector for detection and identification of one object, but reduces false

0.9
0.8

T 0 = t sx+t ex

0.6

alarms by half, the total work time using ALIS (T1) can be expressed as:
If T0 > T1, we obtain te > 2ts, which means that the clearance operation
is expected to be accelerated if the excavation process for one object re-
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T 1 = 2t s x+ 1 t e x
2

0.3
0.2
ALIS
Stand−alone GPR

0.1
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0.6
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1

POD loss
Figure 2: False-alarm rate reduction versus probability-of-detection
loss found in the discrimination process in all tested soil types averaged. The error bar shows 95% confidence bounds.

quires more than twice the time necessary for finding one object, under the assumption that rejected false alarms will not be excavated. For
the sake of humanitarian demining, rejected false alarms may also need
checking, but it can be done quickly if the detected objects are identified
as non-explosive items like Boshoff and Cresci showed with the Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System.12 Even taking into account rapid
excavation to accelerate the process, the situation may be realistic, especially in heavily metal-contaminated areas.
A study shows that the most common activity at the time of an incident is excavation.13 Using a dual-sensor detector to reject metals cannot reduce the potential risk of the excavation process because detected
landmines must be taken out anyway. However, the amount of this
stressful work can be reduced, and it may help deminers concentrate
on their tasks.
Discussion and Conclusions
The test results confirm that dual-sensor detectors can reduce false
alarms as compared to stand-alone metal detectors, which indicates
potential efficiency improvements in clearance operations. However, a
few issues in need of consideration came up during the test and data
analysis, such as probability-of-detection loss, search speed and training. From observation, dual-sensor detectors can correctly reject false
alarms, but they also sometimes falsely reject mines. This seems to happen especially at shallow depths (see Figure 3b), but it also appears related to the soil type.14
Investigating soil properties and screening out unfavorable soil
types can help to minimize the false rejection of mines (probability-of-
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0.6
POD loss

FAR reduction

alone GPR displays almost raw data11 as a vertical slice of the subsurface,
whereas ALIS constructs horizontal slices by applying a number of signal processing operations. As a result, ALIS may be able to obtain more
robust information on targets than the stand-alone GPR through the sophisticated processing.
Figure 4 shows the averaged search speeds of ALIS and stand-alone
metal detectors operated by newly trained vs. experienced personnel.
ALIS required nearly double the metal detector’s time. In other words,
ALIS was twice as slow as the stand-alone metal detectors. In this test,
only detection and discrimination were performed. Excavation and
confirmation of detected objects, which corresponds to the steps 4 and 5
in the Boshoff and Cresci Journal of ERW and Mine Action article, “The
HALO Trust and HSTAMIDS,” were not included.12 Therefore, assessing the efficiency improvements of the entire clearance operation with
a dual-sensor detector in detail is impossible based on the obtained results. However, a rough estimate can be made as follows: Let T0, the total
time necessary for the entire clearance operation with a metal detector,
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Figures 3a and 3b: False-alarm rate reduction and probability-of-detection loss as a function of depth in all soil types averaged. The dashed lines
show 95% confidence bounds.
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detection loss) for dual-sensor detectors. If an
area is assessed as dificult for dual-sensor by
the investigation, a dual-sensor should not be
used and other methods should be employed.
The search speed is directly related to the efficiency improvements, and the higher the
search speed, the more improvements can be
achieved. The test results indicate that dualsensor detectors are twice as slow as standalone metal detectors. Even so, the clearance
operation can be accelerated if a certain number of false alarms are reduced. Furthermore,
an additional attempt in this test indicated
that operators of dual-sensor detectors who
have more experience and knowledge working
with the device can work as fast as operators
using stand-alone metal detectors. However,
this fact also indicates that more training and/
or practice is necessary for dual-sensor detector use when compared to standard metal
detectors. The advantages of experienced per-

sonnel who have trained for a short period of
time appear significant in search speed and
performance.
The dual-sensor test allowed us to evaluate
detection and discrimination performance in
a blind test. Although a very rough estimate
of the efficiency improvements has been made,
other factors need consideration for the detailed assessment such as excavation time, detector costs, and training and practice costs.
Only a long-term field trial can evaluate these
factors.
In the test campaign, stand-alone metal
detectors that possess the capability of discriminating objects were also tested. The
evaluation is not discussed in this article, but
readers interested in these devices can find the
results in the test report. 3
		
see endnotes page 83
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Figure 4: Average search speed of ALIS and stand-alone metal detectors in minutes per
square meter. The labels “MD” and “MD mfr” indicate metal detectors operated by trained
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The Bridge from Hold to Build, Escalante [ from page 12 ]
1.

To Walk the Earth in Safety. 2010. Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs (PM/WRA). http://tiny.cc/jyblf. Accessed 20
September 2010

Destruction of Cluster Munitions in Moldova, King
[ from page 15 ]
1.

2.

Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions. German Federal Foreign Office and Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining. 25 - 26 June 2009. http://bit.ly/d7CKuw. Accessed 1 September 2010.
An electrical squib is a small electrical explosive device which
through detonation can be used to ignite other explosives. Black
powder is an explosive combination of sulfur, charcoal and potassium nitrate, also known as saltpeter.

Albania Makes Progress in Demilitarization, Goodyear
[ from page 19 ]
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

“AMAE Response to Gërdec Tragedy.” Albanian Mine Action
Executive. March 2008. http://tinyurl.com/394qpj8. Assessed 27
September 2010.
Demilitarization is the full range of operations from demolition
to industrial dismantling.
In open detonation, additional explosive charges are added to explosives and munitions to detonate and destroy them.
“Albania.” To Walk The Earth In Safety, 8th Edition, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, June 2009
(Page 27). http://tinyurl.com/39l9zt8. Accessed 27 September
2010.
The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA)
provides funding to the International Trust Fund for Demining
and Mine Victims Assistance, which is managing the Gërdec
site clearance. The Dutch government supported the Albanian
Army EOD with equipment and demolition firing systems. DanChurchAid and the United Nations Development Programme
also assisted immediately following the accident with mine
clearance through Albanian Mine Action Executive. http://bit.
ly/boOmcj. Accessed 4 October 2010.

ly/a4vP29. Accessed 17 June 2010.
Kerimoglu, Rey. “Tartar Regional Vocational Training Centre
Was Opened.” International Eurasia Press Fund. 3 April 2010.
http://bit.ly/b3xz38. Accessed 17 June 2010.
9. “Deborah Netland of the US Department of State Visits IEPF Office in Tertar Region.” Side-Talks Azerbaijan. 29 October 2009.
http://bit.ly/3XYOS0. Accessed 17 June 2010.
10. Perry, Debra. The Basics of Vocational Assessment: A Tool for Finding the Right Match Between People with Disabilities and Occupations. ILO, Bangkok. http://bit.ly/a1156Q. Accessed 17 June 2010.
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Mine Action Development Funding in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Carrier and Powell [ from page 28 ]
1.

2.

3.

4.

The Terter Regional Vocational Training Center, Nwolisa
[from page 23 ]
1.

Professional Development Framework for Vocational Skills of
VET Practitioners. 1st Edition 2009. Government of Western
Australia Department of Education and Training. http://bit.ly/
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From a mine-action institutional perspective, a key area of
concern revolves around the need for the national mine-action
center to differentiate formal mine action (that must be supervised) from “uncontrolled” development intervention in mineaffected areas. For example, when a development organization
implements a standard priority needs assessment in a minecontaminated area, mine-action institutions may interpret it as
a mine-action activity conducted without accreditation and/or
without respecting the existing standard operating procedures.
A solution is possible: The organization conducting development
activities in mine-contaminated areas should be aware of mineaction procedures while mine-action institutions should focus
their supervisory role on the five official mine-action pillars and
related national procedures, namely advocacy to universalize the
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention, assistance to landmine
survivors/victims, clearance of mined areas, mine-risk education, and stockpile destruction.
Gasser, Russell (Dr.) and Music, Almedina. “Evaluation of the
UNICEF Mine Risk Education Programme in Bosnia Herzegovina 2007.” Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining. October 2007. p. 11. http://bit.ly/98tPDL. Accessed 6
October 2010.

Mine-action Funding: GICHD Survey of Donor Countries,
Devlin and Naidoo [ from page 32 ]
1.

2.

Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World Annual Report. International Campaign to Ban Landmines. The
2009 Landmine Monitor refers to total external funding amounting to US$517.8 million in 2008. http://bit.ly/c2uKtd. Accessed
11 October 2010.
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the European Commission (EC), Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada stated it was
unable to respond at this time as it is undergoing a review, and
China, the Czech Republic, France, South Africa, Spain and the

UAE did not respond to the initial message.
3. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for
Action. Organization For Economic Co-operation And Development. http://bit.ly/AvgX. Accessed 11 October 2010.
4. The GICHD study did not explore new funding avenues for development activities in mine-affected communities, for which
there may be significant opportunities.

UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, McCoull [ from page 35 ]
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

9.

Country Portfolio Directors initially were solely U.N. officials,
but some NGOs and national authorities have become more involved. Due to greater involvement in such mine action projects,
these NGOs and countries have had leaders and experts of their
agencies named as Country Portfolio Directors.
“Overview.” Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. http://tinyurl.com/6lah3h. Accessed 7 October 2010.
Millennium Development Goals. For more information: http://
un.org/millennium. Accessed 1 October 2010.
United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).
United Nations Development Group. For more information:
http://undg.org/?p=232. Accessed 11 October 2010.
E-mail from Gustavo Laurie, United Nations Mine Action Service, 9 August 2010, sent on behalf of the HQ Portfolio Team
(UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF).
“Aid Policy: Money for mine action is hard to come by.” Integrated Regional Information Networks. http://tinyurl.com/2bmhroj.
Accessed 11 October 2010.
Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. http://lm.icbl.org. Accessed 11 October 2010.
In addition, the overall problem is diminishing because of effective mine-action efforts having been undertaken and an international normative framework being in place. However, this
does not mean that funding flows should cease but that the focus
can now be on finishing the job in more and more cases, with
national authorities taking the lead, according to UNDP.  
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government
of The Republic of The Sudan and The Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or Naivasha Agreement, ended the Second Sudanese Civil War between the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement and the Government of Sudan.  http://tinyurl.com/
y5y5ut8. Accessed 11 October 2010.

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan, Reza
[ from page 39 ]
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Bolton, Matthew. Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance: Governance, Politics and Security in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan.
London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, February 2010.
Portfolio of Mine Action Projects. (2007, Tenth Edition.) United
Nations Mine Action Service. http://bit.ly/aDYQga. Accessed 30
June 2010.
In Afghanistan, marking is only carried out when minefields are
under active management for survey or clearance. On other sites,
it is not considered a helpful long-term protection measure due
to the risk of materials being removed or moved.
“Afghanistan.” Landmine Monitor Report 2001. New York: International Campaign to Ban Landmines. http://bit.ly/bfc36Z. Accessed 30 June 2010.
“Afghanistan.” Landmine Monitor Report 2003. New York:
International Campaign to Ban Landmines. http://tinyurl.
com/2d5xxxe. Accessed 30 June 2010.
The Integrated Operational Framework is published annually
and is available on the MACCA website at www.macca.org.af.
The current Afghan calendar year 1389 runs 1 April 2010–31
March 2011.
“Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan Newsletter.” Mine Ac-

tion Programme of Afghanistan. May 2010. http://bit.ly/alCdH7.
Accessed 30 June 2010.

Bosnia and Herzegovina Demining 15 Years Later, Grujić
[ from page 43 ]
1.

2.
3.

U.N. peacekeeping force UNPROFOR had originally arrived in
1992, and Security Council Resolution 1031 discussed the transfer of authority.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation that began 12 April 1993
The Implementation Force (IFOR) was a NATO-led multinational force in Bosnia and Herzegovina under a one-year mandate
from 20 December 1995 to 20 December 1996.

Mine Action in Northern Sudan, Hamed [ from page 46]
1.

2.

“The background to Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”
UNMIS. http://bit.ly/aoeQFW. Accessed 05 October 2010.
“Sudan.” E-mine Electronic Mine Information Network. http://
bit.ly/cgjD9r. Accessed 24 August 2010.

Mine-action Program in South Sudan, Mathiang [ from page 49 ]
1.

2.

3.
4.

“The Background to Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”
UNMIS. http://tinyurl.com/246yw4d. Accessed 08 September
2010.
“Government of Sudan Presidential Decree No. 25/2006.” Government of Southern Sudan, Office of the President. Internal
document. 27 June 2006.
The United Nations Mine Action Office. Internal document.
Conversion as of 27 October 2010.

Falkland Islands Demining Pilot Project: Completion of Phase 1,
Swanson [ from page 54]
1.

Although a territory of the United Kingdom, Argentina says it
has a right to the islands, which it calls the Malvinas, because
it inherited them from the Spanish crown in the early 1800s. It
has also based its claim on the islands' proximity to the South
American mainland. It has stressed that its claim to the territory
is nowadays entirely peaceful. For more information: http://tiny.
cc/azd1b. Accessed 4 October 2010.
2. Kuklick, Cory. “Falkland-Malvinas Islands Update” The Journal
of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 14.1. (Spring 2010: 65-66). http://
bit.ly/9HdNC7. Accessed 8 August 2010.
3. The Feasibility Study can be found in PDF version under Item
10 “General Exchange of Views” at the 8th Member States Party
(MSP) meeting in Jordan on 18 November 2007 under Argentina
or U.K. http://bit.ly/bT2S7O. Accessed 8 August 2010.
4. This information was in the form of documents turned over to
the U.K. government by the Argentine military following its surrender; and when they were found to be credible, they allowed
the technical surveys and subsequent clearance to be properly
targeted and conducted
5. BACTEC employed Roger Gagen and Kev Bryant as Project and
Ops Manager repectively plus 37 Zimbabwean and 15 Lebanese
demining personnel.
6. A mixed mine panel is one which contains both anti-personnel
mines and anti-vehicle mines.
7. Centimeter accurate survey similar to, but better than, Differential GPS.
8. This was a separate BAC task designed to check the area south of
the Sapper Hill minefield which was a cluster-munitions strike
during the conflict.
9. This was a technical survey BAC task designed to check the complete area of a cluster-munitions strike during the conflict. It only
represents 10 percent of the headland area released as cleared.
10. The U.K. also laid a small number of minefields some time after
the conflict ended but these were subsequently cleared by U.K.
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military personnel in the mid-1980s.
11. The DPO was provided by C King Associates Ltd.

Strengthening the Demining Sector Response to HIV/AIDS
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Chitsama [ from page 57 ]

“The origin of AIDS and HIV and the first cases of AIDS.” Avert.
http://tiny.cc/xnr6p. Accessed 2 November 2010.
2. Landmine Monitor Report 2007 and 2009. http://the-monitor.org.
Accessed 19 October 2010.
3. “Sub-Saharan Africa.” Aids Epidemic Update 2009 (November
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6. “Barrick Gold’s Tanzanian Corporate Health Responsibility:
The Lake Zone Health Initiative.” Republic of Mining. Home to
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8. “Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention.” World Health
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15.2
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Publish Date: Summer 2011

FEATURE

Deminers on the Front Lines

Our Feature section will tell the stories of deminers working in unusually dangerous
situations, including places where non-state actors or local tensions are still causing
pockets of conflict, or areas in which acts of terrorism, kidnapping and violence are
common. What hazardous conditions are deminers overcoming every day to complete
their work? What dangerous encounters have deminers experienced? How has the landscape of humanitarian mine action changed with respect to security concerns in recent
years? When have areas been deemed too hazardous for demining to continue? Are the
experiences different in countries where mine action is carried out by militaries?

SPECIAL REPORT

Information Management and GIS/Mapping

Landmine survivor and Peer Support Worker Mohamed Alisič helped
Kavara Mehmed, a mine survivor from Bosnia-Herzegovina, recover
from depression and resume his occupation as a farmer.
Photo by Paul Jeffrey/kairosphotos.com

FOCUS

Victim Assistance

Issue 15.2 of The Journal of ERW and Mine Action will focus on
the topic of Victim and Survivor Assistance. Articles related to
services available to landmine survivors, their families and the
communities where they live are requested. We are especially
interested in articles regarding methodologies to help survivors
deal with psychosocial problems as well as physical injuries,
including peer-to-peer support programs, and programs that
help victims, survivors and communities regain socioeconomic
independence. Individual victims’ stories of triumph, as well as
submissions describing the efforts of organizations working with
these survivors, are encouraged. Also of interest are articles about
changes in the deﬁnition and perception of who a survivor or
victim is and how best to assist them, as well as how disabilityadvocacy efforts have helped survivors on their roads to recovery.

reaD tHis:
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This issue will also include a Special Report section on information-management issues
as well as updates in the ﬁeld of Geographic Information Systems and mapping. What
information-management issues does the mine-action community struggle with today?
How has information management for mine-action data changed over the years? What
are the current best practices and what changes are still necessary? How are GIS and mapping techniques being used to inform data collection? How could they be used better?
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for printing.
Contact information/bio: Articles must contain each author’s name and full contact
information at the end of the article (i.e., phone, e-mail and mailing address). Please
include a headshot photo and biography (up to 60 words) of each author for inclusion
at the end of the article. Consider including credentials, books authored and other
biographical information.
Submit all materials to:
Editor-in-Chief, The Journal of ERW & Mine Action
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery/MAIC
James Madison University, MSC 4902
800 S. Main Street
Harrisonburg, VA 22807 / USA
Phone: +1 540 568 2503 / Fax: +1 540 568 8176
E-mail: editormaic@gmail.com

{

To subscribe to The Journal, visit http://maic.jmu.edu/subscribe

}

